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I Introduction 
A Purpose  
This paper explores one very important issue in the regulatory regime for medicines in 
New Zealand and around the world- the deficit of information about medicines available 
to doctors, patients and independent researchers. Much of the information about safety, 
efficacy and quality of drugs is held and controlled by pharmaceutical companies and 
regulators. The public is entitled to this information in full.  
 
Medicines have removed the spectre of many preventable illnesses from daily life, 
increasing our lifespans and easing suffering. The pharmaceutical industry has an 
invaluable role in developing and distributing these drugs. However there are strong 
economic incentives behind the production, patenting and marketing of medicines. In 
New Zealand, the major suppliers of medicines are large multinational companies, for 
example Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline and Roche.1 While some generic (off-patent) drugs are 
manufactured domestically, most medicines are developed and manufactured overseas. 
Similarly, clinical trials to establish a drug’s effectiveness, safety and quality are 
predominantly undertaken overseas.2  
 
This paper investigates the issues present in New Zealand’s medicines regulation and 
provides suggestions for greater transparency and disclosure of data. The analysis will 
also be put in the context of the present development of a joint trans-Tasman regulatory 
agency- the Australia New Zealand Therapeutic Products Agency (ANZTPA).   
 
The key propositions contained below are: 
• That there should be a mandatory clinical trials registry for all trials done 
in Australia and New Zealand, with ethics committees and trial sponsors 
holding responsibility for populating the register. Sufficient enforcement 
  
1  “Members”  (22 April 2013) Medicines New Zealand < http://www.medicinesnz.co.nz/>.  
2  Mark Broatch “Bitter Pills” The Listener (New Zealand, 17 November 2012) at 17.  
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powers and resourcing should be provided for in legislation or Rules to 
ensure the efficacy of this scheme.  
• That a statutory duty should be imposed on the ANZTPA to make all the 
unpublished information it holds about medicines that pass through the 
approval process publicly available. 
• That, generally speaking, the arguments for preventing disclosure of 
official information containing clinical study reports and other 
unpublished raw data would not outweigh the significant public interest in 
disclosure.  
• That administrative law ‘tools’ such as Official Information Act requests, 
Regulations Review Committee complaints, and use of the Ombudsman 
may assist in facilitating disclosure of trial data and clinical study reports 
held by Medsafe or the ANZTPA. 
 
B Key Terms  
‘Medicine’ includes any substance or article that is manufactured, imported, sold or 
supplied for administering to humans for a therapeutic purpose or an ingredient in the 
preparation of a therapeutic substance.3 In this paper, the terms ‘medicine’ and ‘drug’ will 
be used interchangeably.  Both hold the above meaning.  
 
‘Medical devices’ are another important medical intervention. They are machines or 
instruments with a therapeutic use, such as a defibrillator or dialysis machine. Most of the 
discussion in this paper refers to ‘drugs’ or ‘medicines’. However the points made are 
equally applicable to medical devices and information or trial data relating to these 
devices.  
‘New medicine’ means any medicine that has not previously been available in New 
Zealand.4 The manufacturer must seek New Zealand Medicines and Medical Devices 
Safety Authority (Medsafe) approval before it markets, manufactures or promotes a new 
  
3  Medicines Act 1981, s 3(1) and (2).  
4  Medicines Act 1981, s 3(3).  
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medicine in New Zealand. New medicines tend to be more expensive and protected by 
patents. This can be contrasted to off-patent drugs such as paracetamol (often referred to 
as ‘generic’ drugs). 
‘Unapproved medicine’ means a medicine that has not received approval at all, or is 
unapproved for the purpose or dosage it is being prescribed for. This is not a statutory 
definition in New Zealand, but is the common terminology used to refer to a ‘new 
medicine’ or a purpose or dosage that an approved medicine does not have approval for. 
For example, if a medicine approved for adults is prescribed for a child, for a different 
ailment, or at a higher dosage, then it is being prescribed for an ‘unapproved’ use.  
 
‘Complementary health products’ are products provided as alternative or supplementary 
to conventional medicines and medical devices. Examples include vitamins and other 
dietary supplements, homeopathy, herbal remedies, or indigenous medicine. Currently 
these products are regulated under either the Dietary Supplements Regulations 1985 or 
the Medicines Act 1981 but will soon be dealt with under new legislation- the Natural 
Health and Supplementary Products Act.5  
 
A ‘clinical study report’ is where the most complete and informative technical 
information about a drug can be found. These reports are produced by the researchers for 
every trial on a medical intervention and contain vast amounts of information. They detail 
the experimental methods, results and analysis, and provide appendices that list all the 
data from every individual involved in a clinical trial. Journal articles and other 
documents about the drug are written and published using this information. 
C Methodology 
The research for this paper was done predominantly using secondary sources. However, 
some primary research was undertaken. A small number of people with expertise in areas 
relevant to this paper were approached and interviewed. The Victoria University Human 
Ethics Committee granted ethics approval in August 2013 before interviewing 
commenced. Additionally some employees at Medsafe were emailed with questions 
  
5  Currently the Natural Health and Supplementary Products Bill 2011 (324-2).  
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about Medsafe’s approval process. The information received from these interviews and 
email communication is cited in footnotes and anonymised where appropriate. Only 
factual information has been taken from the emails and they are therefore not 
anonymised. All opinions and information given in interviews are attributed 
anonymously using a general description of the person offering them apart from the 
information and opinions received during an interview with two Ombudsmen, in which 
permission was granted to attribute the comments directly.  
 
II The Current Regime for Medicines Regulation 
A Medsafe and the Medicines Act 1981 
The Medicines Act 1981 (the Act) and Medicines Regulations 1984 control the use, 
approval, manufacture, sale and promotion of pharmaceutical drugs in New Zealand. 
Medsafe is authorised by the Ministry of Health to monitor and approve medicines and 
medical devices and administer the Medicines Act. Medsafe is accountable to the 
Minister of Health as a business unit within the Ministry.6 It is also accountable to the 
pharmaceutical industry for those activities funded by fees.7 Medsafe is responsible for 
pre-market approval and post-market monitoring of medicines.8 It analyses new 
medicines for safety, efficacy and quality as well as monitoring reported side effects and 
continuing to evaluate drugs and medical devices once they are on the market.  
 
Another key entity is the Pharmaceutical Management Agency (Pharmac). Pharmac was 
created in 1993 to provide funded access to pharmaceuticals in New Zealand with a 
primary focus on optimising public health outcomes.9 It is in charge of subsidising 
medicines and also plays a public information role advising on the responsible use of 
pharmaceuticals.10 Pharmac undertakes its own clinical analysis as part of its funding 
  
6  “About us” (10 April 2013) Medsafe <www.medsafe.govt.nz>.   
7  “About us”, above n 6.  
8  “About us”, above n 6.  
9  New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, s 46.  
10  New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, s 47 and 48.  
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decision process and is working currently to expand its procurement role to include 
medical devices.11  
 
Medsafe’s approval for new medicines is given for very specific uses.12 Medicines are 
usually approved by regulators to treat a specific symptom or illness or in a particular 
dosage. Approval is given for a substance for certain indications only, for example, ‘for 
use in the treatment of condition X in adults at a dosage of 100mg every 24 hours’. Use 
of a medicine in a higher dose, for a different symptom or illness, or for a different type 
of patient (e.g. pregnant women, or children) requires separate and additional approval. 
Approval must be sought again separately if there are any material changes to an 
approved medicine.13 An application must contain details of the ingredients, dosage, 
purposes of use, claims made in relation to effectiveness, reports of any studies and trials 
on safety and efficacy, evidence of approval in other countries, and the details of the 
manufacturer and manufacturing process.14  
 
The evaluation of a medicine in the approval process is based on information supplied to 
Medsafe by the pharmaceutical company making the application and evidence from other 
relevant published studies. This includes the clinical study report for the medicine and 
data from countries where it is already on the market.15 Medsafe may also request more 
information from the applicant if it considers it appropriate; this can include an order that 
further studies be undertaken.16 Medsafe focuses on information that relates to the 
specific dosage and use being applied for, although applicants are expected to submit all 
  
11  Pharmac “Establishing how PHARMAC will apply its model for medical device management” (19 
August 2013) < http://www.pharmac.health.nz>. 
12  Medicines Act 1981, s 20.  
13  Medicines Act 1981, s 24.   
14  Medicines Act 1981, s 21(2).  
15  Such as the USA or Europe, see “Quality and Safety of Medicines: Medsafe’s Evaluation & 
Approval Process” (23 April 2013) <www.medsafe.govt.nz>. 
16  Medicines Act 1981, s 21(4); Email from Chris James (Manager, Clinical Risk Management, 
Medsafe) to the author regarding enquiry about Medsafe’s powers (11 April 2013); Email from Susan 
Martindale (Principal Advisor, Regulation, Medsafe) to the author regarding queries about the regulation of 
medicines (24 April 2013).  
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studies that relate to safety.17 Failure to disclose all relevant information may result in a 
penalty issued under section 36 of the Act such as suspension of approval, breach of 
which could result in a $5,000 fine or 6 month imprisonment.18 
 
Unapproved medicine can be prescribed if a doctor believes it will be beneficial for their 
patient.19 It may be necessary for patients to use unapproved medicines for rare 
conditions, for different purposes to what approval is granted for, or to try treatments that 
are approved overseas but not in New Zealand. In these instances section 29 of the Act 
requires that the Director-General of Health be notified. In prescribing medicine 
(approved or otherwise) the practitioner must always adhere to adequate professional and 
ethical standards and seek the informed consent of the patient.20 Pharmac also funds some 
unapproved medicines, usually in the rare circumstances where there are no alternative 
medicines with a current approval on the market.21  
B Clinical Trials and Ethics Committees 
Few drugs and devices are developed or trialled in New Zealand compared to the rest of 
the world. However at the time of writing there are 179 centres nationwide where clinical 
trials could be carried out and about 1865 trials voluntarily registered with the Australia 
New Zealand Clinical Trial Register citing New Zealand as the country of recruitment.22 
All clinical trials in New Zealand must be approved and reviewed by the relevant 
university ethics committee or regional Health and Disability Ethics Committee 
(HDEC).23 The HDECs apply the Ethical Guidelines for Observational Studies and 
Ethical Guidelines for Intervention Studies.24 These standards are set and reviewed by the 
  
17  Email from Susan Martindale (Principal Advisor, Regulation, Medsafe) to the author regarding 
queries about the regulation of medicines (29 April 2013).  
18  Email from Susan Martindale, above n 16.  
19  Medicines Act 1981, s 25.  
20  Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights) 
Regulations 1996, schedule 1, rights 4, 6 and 7. 
21  Information received from a confidential source in the government medicines/health area. 
22  Connect Clinical “Search Listings: New Zealand” <www.connectclinical.com.au>; Australian 
New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry <www.anzctr.org.nz> (as at July 2013).   
23  Established under New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, s 11.  
24  National Ethics Advisory Committee Ethical Guidelines for Intervention Studies: Revised Edition 
(Ministry of Health, Wellington, 2012); National Ethics Advisory Committee Ethical Guidelines for 
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National Advisory Committee on Health and Disability Support Services Ethics 
(NEAC).25 Clinical trials using a new medicine require separate additional approval from 
the Director-General of Health.26 All trials in New Zealand must be conducted in 
accordance with the Note for Guidance on Good Clinical Practice issued by the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA), which reflects international best practice.27 
 
III The ANZTPA 
 
In 2003 Australia and New Zealand signed the Agreement between the Government of 
Australia and the Government of New Zealand for the Establishment of a Joint Scheme 
for the Regulation of Therapeutic Products (the Treaty). This Treaty provides for a joint 
trans-Tasman regulator for medicines and medical devices; the Australia New Zealand 
Therapeutic Products Agency (ANZTPA).28 The agreement adds a further component to 
the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (CER) and the 
subsequent framework this has created.29 The CER envisages the eventual creation of a 
‘seamless trans-Tasman business environment’, or single economic market.30 However 
laws relating to complementary medicines and therapeutic goods are exempt from the 
arrangement. The Treaty is an attempt to incorporate medicines regulation into the CER 
framework.  
 
There are several issues that arise when considering the ANZTPA framework in a more 
general sense. Loss of sovereignty and the extent to which the Australian majority may 
                                                                                                                                                 
Observational Studies: Observational research, audits and related activities: Revised Edition (Ministry of 
Health, Wellington, 2012).  
25  Established under New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, s 16.  
26  Medicines Act 1981, s 30.  
27  E6 (R1) Note for Guidance on Good Clinical Practice (CPMP/ICH/135/95) 1996 (European 
Union). 
28  Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand for the 
Establishment of a Joint Scheme for the Regulation of Therapeutic Products (signed 10 December 2003, 
not yet in force) [Joint Therapeutic Agency Treaty].  
29  Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 1329 UNTS 175 (signed 28 
March 1983, entered into force 1 January 1983); Joint Therapeutic Agency Treaty, above n 28, preamble.  
30  New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade “CER and SEM” (16 November 2010) 
<www.mfat.govt.nz>.  
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overbear New Zealanders’ interests are concerns, as are the implications that such a 
scheme will have for Pharmac and its corresponding Australian body.31 However most 
parties seem to agree that the joint agency has the potential to increase efficiency, 
decrease cost and improve the current systems in Australia and New Zealand. Due to the 
constraints of this paper, these more general and wide-ranging issues will not be 
discussed. This paper is restricted to its particular focus - the provisions relating to public 
access to information and how the system will function in this particular area.  
 
This part of the paper provides a general overview of the history and development of the 
ANZTPA as well as a description of the way that the proposed scheme will operate 
according to the information presently available. The anticipated medicines approval 
process of the Agency is included in this overview.  Discussion of particular issues 
relating to information accessibility and recommendations for improvement is in Parts IV 
and VI below.  
A Development    
The switch to ANZTPA regulation is scheduled for 2016, upon passage of legislation in 
both countries, thereby ratifying the Treaty.32 The Medicines Act will be repealed entirely 
and replaced with the implementing legislation for the joint agency. This ratification 
process was initially intended to occur several years ago. However political opposition in 
New Zealand hindered its progress. 
1 The Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill 2006: initial opposition 
In 2006 the Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill (103-1) (the Bill) will be the 
domestic implementing legislation in New Zealand required to ratify the Treaty. The Bill 
narrowly passed its first reading.33 However the Select Committee recommended that it 
  
31  For discussion of this issue in the intellectual property context see Susy Frankel, Chris Nixon, 
Megan Richardson and JohnYeabsley “The Challenges of Trans-Tasman Intellectualy Property 
Coordination” in Susy Frankel and Deborah Ryder (eds) Recalibrating Behaviour: Smarter Regulation in a 
Global World (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2013) 101 at 102.  
32  “About ANZTPA” (26 April 2013) ANZTPA <www.anztpa.org>; Joint Therapeutic Agency 
Treaty, above n 28, art 23.  
33  (12 December 2006) 636 NZPD 7067. The Bill passed by 61 votes to 59. 
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not progress. 34 During the Bill’s first reading there was vocal opposition to a joint agency 
from several political parties (New Zealand National, Green Party, Māori Party, and ACT 
New Zealand) and frustration over lack of consultation and a refusal by the Labour 
Government to take a cross-party approach to the development of the scheme.35  
 
The major point of opposition for New Zealand has always been the inclusion of 
complementary health products in the scheme, particularly the effect that might have on 
traditional Māori medicine (Rongoā).36  The objection with regards to complementary 
medicine is that inclusion in a full-blown medicines regime will result in excessive 
compliance and approval costs for businesses and consumers. Alternative health products 
are generally low-risk (although not always) and therefore the medicines approval 
process is seen as unnecessary, resulting in prohibitively expensive products. Rongoā 
medicine was not included in the Bill and is not regulated at all when administered in the 
traditional way.37 This relieved the concerns over the place for traditional Māori 
medicines but the impact of the scheme on other complementary medicines in New 
Zealand remained contentious.  
2 Recent developments 
In 2011 the New Zealand and Australian Governments revived the joint scheme.38 
Through these negotiations it was agreed that New Zealand could remove its domestic 
complementary health products industry from the ANZTPA scheme.39  Those products 
are now to be separately regulated via the Natural Health and Supplementary Products 
legislation (when enacted).40 The separate regulation will be reviewed after five years 
  
34  Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill 2006 (103-1) (select committee report) at 3.  
35  (12 December 2006) 636 NZPD 7067.   
36  Health Committee Inquiry into the Proposal to Establish a Trans-Tasman Agency to Regulate 
Therapeutic Products (December 2003), at 30, 38 and 48.  
37  (12 December 2006) 636 NZPD 7067.  
38  John Key “Australia, NZ Announce Intention on ANZTPA” (press release, 20 June 2011); 
“Statement of Intent” (27 November 2012) Australian New Zealand Therapeutic Products Agency 
<www.anztpa.org>.  
39  Description of a Possible Joint Regulatory Scheme for Therapeutic Products under ANZTPA 
[ANZTPA Discussion Paper] (ANZTPA, discussion paper, January 2013, at 9.  
40  Natural Health and Supplementary Products Bill 2011 (324-2).  
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from commencement.41 The resolution of the major objections to the joint regulator 
paved the way for renewed negotiations and both countries are now moving towards 
implementation of the joint scheme. At the time of writing the progress is still in its early 
stages, with a discussion document containing high-level policy proposals circulated at 
the beginning of 2013.42 Submissions made in response to this document are currently 
being considered. 
3 Nature and Makeup of the Agency 
The ANZTPA will be overseen by and accountable to the ‘Ministerial Council’ 
comprised of the two Ministers holding the Health portfolios in their respective 
countries.43 The Ministerial Council will appoint members of the ANZTPA Board, which 
will comprise a Chair, Managing Director (the chief executive), one person each from 
New Zealand and Australia with broad experience in public health and regulatory 
matters, and a person with commercial experience.44 Both Ministers must agree on the 
candidate for the Chair and Managing Director positions. However the members from 
their respective countries will be appointed on recommendation of the relevant Minister 
where consensus is not reached.45 Appointment of the fifth member and provisions for 
removal of Board members will be provided for in the Rules.  
 
The Board is directly responsible to the Ministerial Council for financial matters, the 
administration of the ANZTPA, efficiency and effectiveness of ANZTPA performance, 
the strategic direction of the Agency and reporting to the Ministerial Council on these 
matters.46 Management of the ANZTPA is the responsibility of the Managing Director, as 
chief executive officer.47  
 
  
41  ANZTPA Discussion Paper, above n 39, at 9. 
42  ANZTPA Discussion Paper, above n 39. 
43  Joint Therapeutic Agency Treaty, above n 28, art 4.  
44  Joint Therapeutic Agency Treaty, above n 28, art 6(1).  
45  Joint Therapeutic Agency Treaty, above n 28, art 6(2). 
46  Joint Therapeutic Agency Treaty, above n 28, art 6(5).  
47  Joint Therapeutic Agency Treaty, above n 28, art 7.  
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The ANZTPA will be constituted as a body corporate in Australia, but will not have 
international legal personality.48 This means that, while it will have such rights, powers 
and privileges as required to perform its regulatory functions in New Zealand, the 
ANZTPA will have legal personality in Australia only and will be based in Australia.  
However the 2006 Bill emphasises that both countries will have an equal voice in the 
governance of the scheme and envisages that the ANZTPA will look and behave in a way 
similar to a Crown Entity in New Zealand.49 
B  The ANZTPA Regulatory Scheme 
The Treaty provides the overarching rules governing the ANZTPA and powers afforded 
to it, which will then be recognised in implementing legislation in Australia and New 
Zealand. The Agency itself will be given the power to create delegated legislation in the 
form of Rules and Orders, which will provide the detail for the scheme. The Rules must 
uphold the primary purpose of the scheme, which is set out in the Treaty:50 
… [T]o safeguard public health and safety in Australia and New Zealand by establishing 
and maintaining a joint scheme consistent with international best practice for the 
regulation of the quality, safety, and efficacy or performance of therapeutic products, and 
of their manufacture, supply, import, export and promotion. 
The implementing legislation will deal with details such as offences, enforcement, 
judicial review matters, governance and accountability of the ANZTPA and the 
recognition of Rules and Orders.51 It appears that the 2006 Bill will be resurrected and 
amended to create New Zealand’s implementing legislation.  
This section will provide a combined overview and analysis of the proposed provisions in 
the Treaty, the Bill and the discussion document indicating the possible framework and 
regulatory provisions for the trans-Tasman scheme (the Paper).52 The analysis will be 
mostly centred on those provisions relating to the central issue in this paper- the 
  
48  Joint Therapeutic Agency Treaty, above n 28, art 5(4), (5) and (6).  
49  Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill 2006 (103-1), explanatory note.  
50  Joint Therapeutic Agency Treaty, above n 28, art 2(1).  
51  ANZTPA Discussion Paper, above n 39, at 6. 
52  ANZTPA Discussion Paper, above n 39.  
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information deficit. It is useful to bear in mind that these proposals are subject to 
potentially significant changes as the ANZTPA process progresses. Recommendations 
for the ANZTPA legislation and Rules in light of the issues explored in earlier parts of 
this paper will be detailed in Part VI.  
1 Rules and orders 
The Ministerial Council will have the power to make Rules pertaining to most aspects of 
the ANZTPA and providing the detail of the regulatory scheme.53 These Rules are a form 
of delegated legislation and must give effect to the objectives of the Treaty.54 The 
Ministerial Council may also use Rules to further delegate functions or powers of the 
Managing Director or the ANZTPA Board.55 These Rules will cover areas such as the 
representations and promotion allowed in respect of therapeutic products, requirements 
for provision of information to the ANZTPA, establishment of advisory committees, and 
the approvals process for therapeutic products.  
 
The Agency itself may make Orders dealing with several more technical and detailed 
aspects of the regulatory framework.56 ANZTPA will determine, in Orders, standards for 
the information provided to consumers and professionals as well as for other matters 
concerning the quality, safety and efficacy of medicines.57  
 
The New Zealand and Australian Parliaments have the opportunity to disallow in whole 
(not in part) any Rules or Orders at the time they are tabled in both Parliaments. If a Rule 
or Order is disallowed by the Parliament of one party it ceases to have effect in both 
countries.58 The ANZTPA will consider and determine applications for an approval in 
relation to the manufacture, supply, import, export or promotion of a therapeutic product 
in accordance with the Rules.59  Approval will be effective in both territories unless the 
  
53  Joint Therapeutic Agency Treaty, above n 28, art 9. 
54  Joint Therapeutic Agency Treaty, above n 28, art 9.  
55  Joint Therapeutic Agency Treaty, above n 28, art 9 (1)(g) and (o). 
56  Joint Therapeutic Agency Treaty, above n 28, art 10(1).  
57  ANZTPA Discussion Paper, above n 39, at 10.  
58  Joint Therapeutic Agency Treaty, above n 28, art 9(4) and 10(4). 
59  Joint Therapeutic Agency Treaty, above n 28, art 11(1).  
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Approval expressly provides that it only applies in one country but such exceptions will 
be rare and usually temporary. There is also provision to allow one party to depart from 
the scheme in exceptional circumstances. These circumstances may pertain to public 
health, safety, third country trade, or environmental or cultural factors that affect the 
party seeking departure.60  
2 The medicines approval process 
The ANZTPA scheme will split medicines into two classes. Class 1 medicines are 
products that are low risk, such as sunscreen.61 Medicines meeting the criteria and 
containing permitted ingredients will be regulated in Class 1 and will have subsequently 
lower compliance obligations.62 All other medicines will be considered Class 2 and full 
product approval will be required.63 The Paper states that the information provision 
requirements for an application will vary depending on the risk of the medicine but it 
does not elaborate further. ANZTPA will have regard to whether the quality, safety and 
efficacy of the medicine has been satisfactorily established in accordance with the state of 
contemporary scientific knowledge and may seek advice from a relevant expert 
committee.64 
The Paper proposes strict standard conditions be applied to approved medicines. It will be 
a condition of approval that applicants comply with monitoring requirements for the drug 
and it will be an offence not to report serious adverse effects.65 Approved medicines may 
not be advertised for unapproved uses, and the approval holder must provide information 
about any overseas regulatory action that has been taken in relation to the medicine or 
product in question.66 In addition, ANZTPA may impose specific conditions on the 
approval at its own initiative.67 Holders of approval for a Class 1 medicine must also 
  
60  Joint Therapeutic Agency Treaty, above n 28, art 12. 
61  ANZTPA Discussion Paper, above n 39, at 14.  
62  ANZTPA Discussion Paper, above n 39, at 14 to 16.  
63  ANZTPA Discussion Paper, above n 39, at 17.  
64  ANZTPA Discussion Paper, above n 39, at 17. 
65  ANZTPA Discussion Paper, above n 39, at 20; Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill 2006 
(103-1), cl 76.  
66  ANZTPA Discussion Paper, above n 39, at 20. 
67  ANZTPA Discussion Paper, above n 39, at 20. 
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retain information or evidence supporting any claims made about the medicine and 
provide it to the Agency on request.  
A major deficit of the system in place today, which is not fully addressed in the 
legislation and discussion paper for the ANZTPA, is the appropriate scrutiny for 
combination medicines, and medical devices. Medical devices are not currently required 
to submit to a pre-market approval process. They are only monitored for adverse effects 
post-market. Therefore, medical devices that are not properly assessed, possibly with 
risks that outweigh their benefits, are introduced onto the market through this legislative 
deficiency.68 Two examples of this are DePuy ASR artificial hips and Poly Implant 
Prothese silicone breast implants- both of which have recently been found to cause 
unacceptable adverse effects.69 The ANZTPA scheme will require that medical devices 
obtain pre-market approval although some academics suggest ANZTPA should go further 
and undertake safety assessments of these products itself.70 Before the ANZTPA begins 
to operate, Pharmac will have begun its procurement model for medical devices. There is 
potential for overlap with Medsafe’s role -Pharmac will need to do clinical testing of the 
devices, especially because it cannot rely on Medsafe approval as is the case with 
medicines.  The ANZTPA scheme will resolve this issue once ANZTPA begins to 
approve and assess medical devices pre-market.71  
A ‘combination product’ is “a therapeutic or diagnostic product that combines a 
medicine, device, and/or biological product into a single entity.”72 These products 
straddle the boundary between medicines and medical devices, as they achieve a 
therapeutic function with a combination of physical and mechanical actions. Many 
therapeutic products now on the market are combination products but the ANZTPA 
legislation does not make provision for such products nor suggest how they might be 
  
68  Dhruva SS, Redberg RF “Medical Device Regulation: Time to Improve Performance” (2012) 9 
PLoS Med e1001277. 
69  Jennifer Moore “Proposed Changes to New Zealand’s Medicines Legislation in the Medicines 
Amendment Bill 2011” (2013) 10 Journal Bioethical Inquiry 59, at 65.  
70  Moore, above n 69, at 66. 
71  Information received from a confidential source in the government medicines/health area. 
72  Moore, above n 69, at 64.  
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properly regulated under the scheme- as medicines or as medical devices.73 Again, this 
needs clarification and clear provisions to be enacted to cater for these novel but fast-
growing types of medicine. The ANZTPA scheme must be able to meet the future needs 
of patients and apply to novel therapeutic products as well as the more traditional 
pharmaceutical drugs. 
IV The Information Deficit in Medicine 
 
Patients expect medical decisions to be based on scientific evidence. They expect that 
new drugs be tested in fair, replicable clinical trials before applications are made for 
market approval. They expect regulators to make fully informed, transparent approval 
decisions on the basis of reliable data and information provided by the applicant. Finally, 
they expect that when their doctor is considering a treatment for their condition they have 
access to all the information necessary to weigh up the costs and benefits of the drug for 
them. However, this does not always occur. Doctors and independent researchers do not 
have access to all the available information about medicines, only that which is 
published. As will be explored below, this published information contains bias and 
conceals data relevant to the drug’s safety and efficacy. Medsafe receives more 
information than is shared with doctors. Furthermore, industry-funded clinical trials can 
be compromised by a strong financial incentive to hide unflattering results. In this paper, 
the situation described above is termed the ‘information deficit’. 
 
This part of the paper outlines the issues concerning access to information and hidden 
data that occur in our current system. Part V discusses pharmaceutical companies’ role in 
information provision and some strategies used by the industry when presenting 
information about drug trials. Part VI contains recommendations to address these issues. 
Additional examples of the implications of this information deficit are provided in the 
three appendices attached at the end of the paper.  
  
73  Moore, above n 69, at 64.  
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A Hidden Data and its Impact on Public Health 
There is a large body of evidence that suggests that a significant number of negative or 
unflattering clinical trials for medical interventions remain unpublished.74 This is known 
as publication bias. It occurs in both industry-funded research and in academia generally. 
While not necessarily wilful or malicious, many data remain hidden. This can be for a 
variety of reasons, such as difficulties with and disincentives to publishing trials with 
inconclusive or negative results in journals, or a decision to discontinue a trial or drug 
development. The result is that the scientific literature may give the impression that a 
drug is effective or safe when the sum of all research on a drug may actually indicate that 
the risks outweigh the benefits. This is misleading for independent researchers, doctors 
and patients relying on the published literature.  
 
Regulators, including Medsafe, receive the clinical study report for drugs submitted for 
approval and use it to make their approval decision. However, pharmaceutical companies 
do not make the clinical study reports for their medicines publicly available and 
regulators are also likely to refuse to disclose them, citing reasons of commercial 
sensitivity.75 This means that in most cases clinical study reports are out of the reach of 
independent researchers and doctors. The regulators themselves undertake an analysis of 
the clinical study report during their approval decision but Medsafe does not make its 
evaluations public.76   
 
It must be noted that, even if all information on newly developed drugs was shared from 
today onwards, this would not be sufficient to address the information deficit. The vast 
majority of drugs that are prescribed by practitioners were developed and trialled several 
  
74  Chalmers Iain “Underreporting Research is Scientific Misconduct” (1990) 263 JAMA 1405; Lee 
K, Bacchetti P, Sim I “Publication of clinical trials supporting successful new drug applications: a literature 
analysis” (2008) 5 PLoS Med e191; Melander H, Ahlqvist-Rastad J, Meijer G, Beerman B “Evidence 
b(i)ased medicine- selective reporting from studies sponsored by pharmaceutical industry: review of studies 
in new drug applications” (2003) 326 BMJ 1171; Song F, Parekh S, Hooper L, Loke YK, Ryder J, Sutton 
AJ et al “Dissemination and publication of research findings: an updated review of related biases” (2010) 
14 Health Technol Assess 1; Written evidence from PLoS (CT20), UK House of Commons, Science and 
Technology Select Committee Clinical Trials (written evidence, 6 March 2013) at 122.  
75  Email from Susan Martindale, above n 16.  
76  Email from Susan Martindale, above n 16. 
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years, or even decades, ago. Therefore manufacturers and regulators must also release 
information from clinical trials retrospectively in order to create a meaningful solution to 
this issue.  
 
The latest high-profile example of withheld data arose in 2012 and is on-going. Tamiflu 
(oseltamivir) was purchased in bulk by governments all over the world, including New 
Zealand, during the outbreak of the H1N1 influenza virus in 2009. This decision was 
predominantly based on a selection of published trials stating that it reduced secondary 
complications of influenza and hospital admission.77 Parts of the clinical study reports 
were obtained by a group of researchers from the Cochrane Collaboration through 
Freedom of Information Act 2000 (United Kingdom) requests and negotiations with the 
manufacturer, Roche. The researchers subsequently found that some serious adverse 
effects that occurred in the trials were not published and some of Roche’s claims 
appeared inconsistent with the results of the trials.78  
1 Examples of the ramifications of the information deficit 
The following examples illustrate the impact that publication bias and hidden data can 
have on public health.  
 
Drug X has been tested in 80 clinical trials. 44 of these indicate that X is overall 
beneficial for adults with Condition Z. 32 indicate that X is no better than any other 
treatment for Z on the market, or that X is not better than placebo based on statistical 
significance. Four trials show that several participants dropped out of the trial because of 
unbearable side effects or that some participants died during the trial (the death may not 
  
77  Kaiser L, Wat C, Mills T, Mahoney P, Ward P and Hayden F “Impact of oseltamivir treatment on 
influenza-related lower respiratory tract complications and hospitalizations” (2003) 163 Arch Intern Med 
1667.  
78  Peter Doshi, Tom Jefferson and Chris Del Mar “The Imperative to Share Clinical Study Reports: 
Recommendations from the Tamiflu Experience” (2012) 9 PLoS Med e1001201; British Medical Journal 
“Tamiflu Campaign” (2013) BMJ <www.bmj.com/tamiflu>. The Cochrane Collaboration is an independent 
international network of medical experts that aims to compile comprehensive systematic reviews of safety 
and efficacy data for medicines. It has developed a reputation for providing a ‘gold standard’ for reviews of 
pharmaceutical drugs and is committed to advancing evidence-based medicine and transparency. All 
reviews are publicly available: <www.cochrane.org>. 
20 Evidence Based Medicine? Access to Information and Medicines Regulation in New Zealand 
 
be caused by X, but these results could indicate a need for more research or 
investigation). Overall, there are 44 positive trials for X and 36 negative or neutral trials. 
This shows mixed results. If all trials are published then the literature will reflect that. If 
42 positive trials are published and seven negative or neutral trials are published, this 
presents a very different picture of Drug X.  It appears much more effective and safe than 
it may actually be. Doctors may be unaware of the four trials where patients dropped out 
or died, and may decide on balance that the evidence comes down overwhelmingly in 
favour of Drug X and prescribe it for their patient with Z. That patient is exposed to 
significant risk because their doctors are not fully informed. The literature is skewed in 
favour of a drug that may do them more harm than good, or may cost them a lot more 
than an off-patent medicine that performs just as well. 
 
Drug A was developed by PharmaCo in 1980, designed for patients who have suffered 
heart attacks and now have irregular heart rhythms.79 A was trialled in 100 patients, 50 
were given A and 50 were given placebo. Of the first 50, ten patients died. Of the second 
50, only one died. It seemed that Drug A was a failure, commercial funding was stopped 
and the trial and development discontinued. Because commercial development was 
stopped, PharmaCo’s scientists never published anything about the trial of Drug A.  In 
1990, MedCo had a similar idea, and developed Drug C- a similar drug to A and also 
used to treat irregular heart rhythms. C was brought to market and prescribed all over the 
world. However, Drug C also caused an increased risk of death. By the time this was 
detected thousands of patients who had been using C had died. Had PharmaCo published 
its 1980 trial, it may have prevented these deaths as medical professionals and drug 
developers would have been aware of Drug A’s existence and the effects seen in its early 
trial.  
2 Inquiry into hidden data by the House of Commons 
The United Kingdom House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee are 
currently undertaking an Inquiry into clinical trials and the problem of hidden data in 
  
79  This example is based on the drug Lorcainide and other antiarrhythmic medicines. See Cowley AJ, 
Skene A, Stainer K, and Hampton JR “The effect of lorcainide on arrhythmias and survival in patients with 
acute myocardial infarction: an example of publication bias” (1993) 40(2) Int J Cardiol 161.  
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medicine.80 The Committee has received expert evidence from 61 regulators, academics, 
and industry representatives in the medicine and pharmaceutical drugs regulation field. 
The findings from this evidence suggests that pharmaceutical companies and academics 
do not make public the existence of every trial they conduct in the United Kingdom and 
Europe, nor do they make the data from these unpublished trials available. Furthermore, 
regulators also fail to provide the public with the information they receive during the 
medicines approval process or with details of their evaluations.  
Whether wilful or not, this ‘hidden data’ has created a situation that is injurious to public 
health and which occurs on a global scale including in New Zealand and Australia. The 
Inquiry provides important information and recommendations that will also be relevant 
for New Zealand and Australia. Therefore the evidence and findings of the Inquiry in 
relation to clinical trials and hidden data will be discussed in this Part. Recommendations 
made by the Inquiry will also be analysed in Part VI below.  
B Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights 
Patients’ rights to be fully informed in making treatment decisions are protected in New 
Zealand in the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights (the Code).81 
The applicable rights are Rights 4 and 6. Right 4 provides that every consumer has the 
right to have services provided that comply with legal, professional, ethical and other 
relevant standards.82 Furthermore, every consumer has the right to have services provided 
in a manner that minimises potential harm and optimises their quality of life.83 Right 6 
enshrines the right to information that a reasonable consumer would expect to receive in 
the circumstances, including an evaluation of the treatment options available that gives an 
assessment of the expected risks, side effects, benefits and costs of each option.84 Before 
making a choice about a medical intervention, all consumers have the right to information 
that they need to make an informed choice or give informed consent.  
  
80  UK House of Commons, Science and Technology Committee Clinical Trials (written evidence, 6 
March 2013).  
81  Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights) 
Regulations 1996, schedule 1, cl 2, rights 6 and 7.  
82  Schedule 1, cl 2, right 4(2).  
83  Schedule 1, cl 2, right 4(4).  
84  Schedule 1, cl 2, right 6(1)(b) and (c).  
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Despite doctors’ best efforts there is currently no way to guarantee that patients will 
receive fully informed advice about the treatment options available to them because 
doctors cannot access complete information and data about all the trials and studies done 
on an intervention. Nor can doctors be sure how many trials or data are missing from 
their review of the publicly available literature. This prohibits patients’ ability to give 
fully informed consent and puts them at unnecessary risk of undisclosed side-effects or 
problems that might have been picked up in successive assessments or re-analysis of the 
trial data by subsequent researchers and experts.  
 
A provider is not in breach of the Code if they have taken reasonable actions in the 
circumstances (including their own resource constraints) to give effect to the rights in the 
Code.85  Therefore the issues that this information deficit causes in light of the Code are 
not enforceable against practitioners so long as they have made a treatment decision on 
the basis of all the (published) information available to them. This means that patients 
have no recourse to enforce their rights to be fully informed via the Code in this 
particular context. Patients are still at risk of breaches of the standard of medical care 
they are entitled to expect because their practitioners cannot provide them with full 
information about a treatment despite acting exactly as the law and ethical standards 
requires. The rights protected by the Code are undermined by the failures in transparency 
that have been made and continue to be allowed by the current regulatory system.  
 
Without all the information about a treatment, the patient or practitioner cannot make a 
valid and informed decision.86 A doctor must be able to access full and accurate 
information about a drug’s safety and efficacy in order to provide quality treatment.87 
When treatment decisions are made in the context of prescribing an unapproved medicine 
the need for accurate and transparent information to be available to a practitioner 
becomes even more important. Appendix One below illustrates this point.  
  
85  Schedule 1, cl 3.  
86  Rogers v Whitaker [1992] HCA 58; (1992) 175 CLR 479 at [9] to [14]. 
87  See Appendix One for a case study.  
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C Clinical Trials Register 
A clinical trials register is a list of clinical trials that receive ethics approval and the 
results of those trials once completed. This list can be checked alongside the published 
literature to give doctors, researchers, regulators and patients some idea of how much 
information about a particular drug or device remains unpublished, undisclosed, or 
subject to further research. There are several clinical trial registers around the world, 
including the voluntary Australia New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry, which was 
established in 2005 and is managed by a not-for-profit organisation.88 However, the 
effectiveness of a clinical trial register is limited unless it contains all the trials 
undertaken within its jurisdiction and is populated retrospectively to include past trials for 
drugs that were developed before it was created. Many medicines that are prescribed 
today were developed several years ago, meaning that the data publicly available for 
those drugs will remain insufficient unless the results of all the trials conducted, including 
those that remain unpublished, are made available retrospectively. While there are many 
trials listed in the ANZCTR, some of which were registered retrospectively, it will not 
provide a truly useful resource for doctors and patients until all trials conducted in 
Australia and New Zealand are contained on the database.  
 
The first jurisdiction to require registration of clinical trials by law was the United States. 
The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act 2007 requires that all interventional 
clinical trials for regulated drugs and devices undertaken in the United States be 
registered on a new database, Clinicaltrials.gov, and that all results for those trials be put 
on the database no longer than 12 months after completion.89 If a trial reaches its 
completion before the drug is approved for use, then the deadline for posting results is no 
more than 30 days after approval is given.90 Violations were supposed to be met with a 
fine of up to US$10,000 followed by a further US$10,000 for every day the violation was 
  
88  (29 April 2013) Australia New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry < http://www.anzctr.org.au/>.  
89  Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act 2007 Pub L No 110-85, § 801, 121 Stat 904, at 
905.  
90  Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act 2007 Pub L No 110-85, § 801, 121 Stat 904, at 
914.  
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not remedied after a 30-day grace period.91 For government-funded studies that fail to 
register, the penalty was a withholding of grant funds.92 However apparent lack of 
enforcement has meant that drug developers have been able to evade their obligations to 
register their clinical trials and results.93 A study in 2012 found that only one in five trials 
conducted since the legislation came into force has been registered within the legislative 
deadline.94  
D Information and Medsafe 
As discussed in Part II above, Medsafe receives a lot of unpublished data and information 
about medicines that are submitted for approval, including clinical study reports. Medsafe 
can also require that more information be provided and exercises that power routinely.95 
To ensure that all information is given to Medsafe, applicants are required to make a 
declaration that no relevant information has been omitted from their application.96 
However members of the public, including doctors and independent researchers, cannot 
access the clinical study reports that are held by Medsafe. Nor are Medsafe’s decisions 
and evaluation of medicines routinely made publicly available. The Official Information 
Act 1982 (OIA) does apply and Medsafe will release some information about a decision 
where it is required to do so. 97 However information on safety, quality and efficacy will 
usually be withheld to protect commercial sensitivity.98 Regulators in other jurisdictions 
have similar data-protection policies, although some such as the European Medicines 
Agency (EMA) are changing their policies towards greater transparency.  
 
  
91  Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act 2007 Pub L No 110-85, § 801, 121 Stat 904, at 
921.  
92  Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act 2007 Pub L No 110-85, § 801, 121 Stat 904, at 
918.  
93  Ben Goldacre Bad Pharma: How drug companies mislead doctors and harm patients (Fourth 
Estate, London, 2012), at 52.  
94  Prayle AP, Hurley MN, Smyth AR “Compliance with mandatory reporting of clinical trial results 
on ClinicalTrial.gov: cross-sectional study” (2012) 344 BMJ d7373. 
95  Medicines Act 1981, s 21(54); Email from Susan Martindale, above n 16. 
96  Medsafe New Zealand Regulatory Guidelines for Medicine: Part E: Templates, declarations and 
checklists (6.14 ed, Ministry of Health, July 2011) at 1.13.   
97  Email from Susan Martindale, above n 16 
98  Email from Susan Martindale, above n 16; Official Information Act 1982, s 9(2).  
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The information that doctors and patients receive from Medsafe is in summary form.  
Most medicines are accompanied by a ‘Consumer Medicine Information’ pamphlet 
(CMI) that contains information written for patients. The relevant pharmaceutical 
company is responsible for producing CMIs and is not legally required to do so. Medsafe 
does not approve or evaluate CMIs.99 Data sheets, on the other hand, are required by the 
Medicines Regulations 1984 and contain greater detail and technical prescribing 
information for medical practitioners.100  
 
As argued in the following parts of this paper, Medsafe should make its reports and 
evaluations prepared for the drug approval process publicly available. It should also 
ensure that all unpublished studies and clinical study reports it receives from applicants 
are made public.  
E Justifications for Restricting Public Access to Clinical Study Reports and Other 
Unpublished Information 
There are several arguments made for restricting public access to clinical study reports, 
some more valid than others. The following are common justifications for non-disclosure: 
• Commercial sensitivity; 
• Protection of trial participants’ confidentiality; and 
• Risk of misinterpretation of large datasets by laypersons or those with a malicious 
intent. 
The following analysis will demonstrate that all of those perceived risks can be resolved 
without compromising transparency.  
1 Commercial sensitivity 
‘Commercially sensitive’ information involves a trade secret or is information that would 
unreasonably prejudice the commercial position of the person who supplied it if it was 
disclosed.101 It is important to protect pharmaceutical companies to some extent in order 
  
99  “Consumer Medicine Information” (23 April 2013) Medsafe <www.medsafe.govt.nz>. 
100  Sections 51 to 53.  
101  Official Information Act 1982, s 9(2)(b); Official Information Legislation Guides: Part 5 Common 
Misconceptions (Office of the Ombudsman, Guideline) at 7 to 8.  
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to provide incentives for innovation and to allow them to recover the significant costs 
associated with developing a new drug. However, the threshold for withholding safety 
and efficacy information or clinical study reports about a drug in favour of commercial 
interests should be very high. In fact, it is arguable that commercial sensitivity arguments 
would not ‘trump’ the imperative to release this data.  
 
The strong public interest argument for ensuring the safety and efficacy of medicines 
arguably overrides all but the most critical of commercial interests. Details about the 
molecular structure of the drug or its manufacture could reasonably be considered 
commercially sensitive and should be protected.102 However these clinical study report 
documents do not include information about the composition or preparation of the drug 
itself or trade secrets.103 More relevant in the context of clinical study reports is the 
commercial impact that negative information revealed in them could have, such as that 
the drug is no better than its competitors.  
 
A decision by the European Ombudsman in 2010 rebutted the proposition made by the 
European Medicines Agency (EMA) that releasing clinical study reports and other 
unpublished data on anti-obesity medicines would prejudice the commercial interests of 
the manufacturer.104 As well as the justifications already discussed above, the EMA 
argued that the data contained in clinical study reports could be used by competitors to 
develop a similar product and that competitors would also get information about the long-
term clinical development strategy of the manufacturing company.105 The Ombudsman 
found that the EMA had failed to elaborate on how the clinical study report would be 
used by competitors and also that the documents in question did not contain details of the 
development strategy.  
 
  
102  Decision of the European Ombudsman closing his inquiry into complaint 2560/2007/BEH against 
the European Medicines Agency (P Nikiforos Diamandouros, European Ombudsman, 24 November 2010), 
at [75]. 
103  Decision of the European Ombudsman, above n 102 at [78].  
104  Decision of the European Ombudsman, above n 102.  
105  Decision of the European Ombudsman, above n 102, at [80] to [83].  
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Redaction is a more suitable way to protect commercial sensitivity in clinical study 
reports and unpublished trials than complete non-disclosure. A review of clinical study 
reports to redact any trade secrets or legitimately commercially sensitive information 
before the regulator releases the reports would not be overly burdensome for a regulator 
or the manufacturer. Legislative provisions preventing publication of the clinical study 
report and unpublished trials before Medsafe has made a decision on market approval are 
also an option. Such a provision already exists in the Medicines Act with regards to 
innovative medicines.106 However, following consideration by Medsafe the most 
appropriate course of action would be to release this unpublished data whether or not 
approval was given, as the reasons for Medsafe declining to give approval to a particular 
medicine are also very important for patients and doctors to be aware of.107  
 
Patent law requires that the patentee disclose many aspects of the drug that could be cited 
as commercially sensitive. The Patents Act 1953 requires that patents specifications 
include a full description of the invention and the best method of manufacture.108 In the 
pharmaceutical context this involves the use of the medicine, the manufacture, the active 
ingredient, the composition of the drug, and the inert carrier compound for the active 
ingredient.109 It is safe to assume that before an application for market approval, 
especially in New Zealand or Australia, the drug in question has already been patented 
and the information listed above is already publicly accessible on the Patents Register. 
While an exhaustive analysis of the relevant patent law is outside the scope of this paper, 
it seems that releasing clinical trial data and unpublished trials to the public will not be 
prejudicial to any patent application or intellectual property rights.110 
  
106  Medicines Act 1981, s 23B.  
107  Interview with Ron Paterson and Leo Donnelly, Ombudsmen (the author, Wellington, 11 
September 2013).  
108  Patents Act 1953, s 10.  
109  Pharmaceutical Management Company Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [2000] 2 NZLR 529; 
[2000] RPC 857; (1999) 9 TCLR 429, at [3] and [59].  
110  Decision of the European Ombudsman, above n 102, at [77].  
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2 Protection of Patient Confidentiality 
Protests against disclosing clinical study reports centre on the risk that the individual trial 
participants will be identifiable and therefore their confidentiality will be breached.111 
This risk, while legitimate, can be solved. Firstly, it is a basic requirement of the ethics 
approval process that the privacy of the individuals in clinical trials is maintained. To that 
end, individuals are referred to in clinical study reports using identification and test centre 
numbers.112 The information linking patients to their numbers is not publicly available. 
However, it is possible that a combination of physical features described in the clinical 
study report with regards to an individual patient may be enough to identify that person in 
some circumstances. In cases where the individual patient data may be enough to identify 
a patient this can be addressed by redaction. The European Ombudsman has pointed out 
that because clinical study reports are highly structured documents which separate 
individual patient data from other parts of the report, removing private data by redaction 
is fairly straightforward and does not create an undue administrative burden.113 
3 Misinterpretation of the Data and an Information Overload 
Concerns have been raised that publicly available clinical study reports and regulatory 
information or decisions will be misinterpreted by lay people causing health scares, or 
used by competitors to attack the manufacturer. It is submitted in this paper that these 
fears are overblown.  
 
The primary benefit from publication of clinical study reports will be the meta-analyses 
and systematic reviews done by independent researchers using the newly available data. 
If a study or academic report is written using clinical study report data that has been 
interpreted wrongly or ‘cherry picked’ to attack the industry or manufacturer it will not 
hold much scientific value unless it is substantively true and able to be replicated and 
tested. In scientific literature the methods must be included in the report or article, so a 
report using flawed methods or bias when selecting data will not carry much weight, if 
any, in the literature. Additionally it will have to pass through the peer review process. 
  
111  Doshi et al, above n 78.  
112  Decision of the European Ombudsman, above n 102, at [86].  
113  Decision of the European Ombudsman, above n 102, at [37].  
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Doctors and other interested parties will then have access to these independent 
assessments and will be empowered to make better-informed treatment decisions. 
 
Most lay people would not be interested in or able to understand the level of detail that is 
included in the data in clinical study reports. Additionally, most doctors would not 
attempt or be able to analyse such complex raw data themselves. While it is possible that 
lay people may misuse the data and clinical study reports, this is a fear that applies to a 
minority of cases. A lot of information is already available to patients and patient groups 
about medicines, most of which is in scientific journals and involves complex scientific 
concepts. However, these are not regularly misinterpreted or misused by patients or other 
parties to create health scares.  
F Positive Reasons for Disclosure 
The most significant argument for disclosure of clinical study reports and other 
unpublished trial data is that there is a significant public interest in the transparency of 
trial results and data on medical interventions. As discussed in section A above, 
publication bias and hidden data presents a significant challenge to public health and 
create unnecessary risk for patients. The competing interests at stake are commercial and 
financial considerations that should be secondary to safeguarding public health and 
protecting patient faith in the regulatory system. Making all information available allows 
for independent assessment of the data and promotes fully informed treatment decisions. 
Additionally, both Medsafe and the ANZTPA have public health as their primary 
objective. The New Zealand government more generally is also moving towards a 
presumption of transparency and openness with regards to official information and 
decision-making.     
 
It is also important to remember that the developers of a drug have an ethical imperative 
to publish all the data they glean from clinical trials.114 A team of Cochrane Collaboration 
researchers noted:115 
  
114  Written evidence from PLoS (CT20), above n 74, at 122; Written evidence submitted by Gly 
Moody (CT22), UK House of Commons, Science and Technology Select Committee Clinical Trials 
(written evidence, 6 March 2013), at 131.  
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“…[C]linical trials are experiments conducted on humans that carry an assumption of 
contributing to medical knowledge. Non-disclosure of complete trial results undermines the 
philanthropy of human participants” 
 
V Information and the Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
Pharmaceutical companies provide limited information to patients and doctors, and this 
information is often tailored to project a positive image of their drug while downplaying 
its negative aspects. Some of the strategies that are used by the industry include 
selectively publishing and designing trials of their medicines; the use of medical writers 
and strategies for publication as part of the marketing of a new medicine; and direct-to-
consumer advertising. Failure to properly inform patients of risks and side-effects known 
to the manufacturer has been held in Australia to be unlawful as misleading and deceptive 
conduct.116  
A Flawed Trials and Hidden Data 
Industry-funded trials that are reported in academic journals are significantly more likely 
to show positive results and overstate the benefits of a drug than independent trials or 
studies.117  This is caused by a number of factors:  
• Publication bias, whereby positive results are more likely to be published than 
negative or neutral results. This problem is not just limited to industry-funded 
publications.  
• The medicine is sometimes compared to an alternative that the researcher knows 
is worse- such as a placebo or a competitor drug at a very low dose- rather than 
the current best treatment for the condition.118 
                                                                                                                                                 
115  Doshi et al, above n 78.  
116  Peterson v Merck, Sharpe and Dohme (Aust) Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 180. 
117  Bourgeois FT, Murthy S, Mandl KD “Outcome Reporting Among Drug Trials Registered in 
ClinicalTrials.gov” (2010) 153 Annals of Internal Medicine 158; Bekelman JE, Li Y, Gross CP “Scope and 
Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: a systematic review” (2003) 289 JAMA 
454; Sergio S “Pharmaceutical company funding and its consequences: a qualitative systematic review” 
(2008) 29 Contemporary Clinical Trials 109; Goldacre, above n 93, at 80; Joel Lexchin, Lisa A Bero, 
Benjamin Djulbegovic, Otavio Clark “Pharmaceutical industry sponsorship and research outcome and 
quality: systematic review” (2003) 326 BMJ 1167. 
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• Patients in clinical trials are sometimes selected carefully so that they are more 
likely to show improvement during the trial.119 
• Trials may be stopped early or extended beyond the initial end-date. This distorts 
the data, without the knowledge of the reader.120  
 
Because of the huge economic incentive connected to the success of a newly developed 
medicine, it is unsurprising that industry-funded trials are written-up and publicised in a 
way that emphasises the positive aspects of a medicine while downplaying or concealing 
unflattering results. There is a clear conflict of interest because these publications and 
trials are fully funded and directed by the company developing the medicine. This makes 
it all the more important to release the clinical study reports and other unpublished data to 
allow independent analysis of the data collected in clinical trials.  
B Medical Writing 
As part of their drug development and marketing process, pharmaceutical companies 
employ medical writers- institutions or freelancers that specialise in writing up clinical 
trials and provide full ‘publication strategy’ services.121 Medical writers meet with senior 
members of a company’s drug development team and clinical researchers to work on 
manuscripts, posters, presentations about the new medicine, and to discuss the journals 
that will be targeted for publication.122  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
118  Safer DJ “Design and Reporting modifications in industry-sponsored psychopharmacology trials” 
(2009) 190 J Nerv Ment Dis 583; Goldacre, above n 93, at 180.  
119  Rothwell PM “External validity of randomised controlled trials: “to whom do the results of this 
trial apply?” (2005) 365 The Lancet 82; Goldacre, above n 117, at 177.  
120  Muellers PS, Montori VM, Bassler D, Koenig BA, Guyatt GH “Ethical Issues in Stopping 
Randomized Trials Early Because of Apparent Benefit” (2007) 146 Annals of Internal Medicine 878; 
Bassler D, Briel M, Montori VM, Lane M, Glasziou P, Zhou Q et al “Stopping Randomized Trials Early 
for Benefit and Estimation of Treatment Effects: Systematic Review and Meta-regression Analysis” (2010) 
303 JAMA 1180; Goldacre, above n 117, at 181.   
121  Linda Logdberg “Being the Ghost in the Machine: A Medical Ghostwriter’s Personal View” 
(2011) 8 PLoS Med 8; New Zealand-based medical writing companies include: ADIS International; SGS 
New Zealand; Rata Communications; Biowrite Solutions; Quintiles.  
122  Information received from a confidential source in the medical industry with background as a 
medical ‘ghostwriter’.  
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A medical writer will produce several draft manuscripts to submit to targeted journals and 
send these drafts to external authors- usually credible academics who have agreed to co-
author the articles or act as ‘Key Opinion Leaders’ by presenting information about the 
drug to colleagues.123 The medical writing industry promotes itself as ‘quality control’, 
assisting busy researchers to write up the results of their trials without delay. However, 
the process of medical writing for pharmaceutical company-funded trials is not 
independent from the company itself. Pharmaceutical companies have first input as to 
content, full control over the presentation of data and the writing process, and control the 
key message of these publications.124 The prevalence of medical writing assistance is 
difficult to determine, as it is a highly fragmented and unregulated global industry. 
However it appears that the vast majority of studies with industry-based sponsors are 
written-up by medical writers.125  
 
The association of an external expert ‘author’ lends articles and trial reports an air of 
independence and significant academic weight, especially when the contribution of the 
medical writer and input of the sponsor company has not been disclosed. Many of the 
more reputable medical journals such as the Lancet or British Medical Journal now 
demand transparency about the origins and authorship of reports that are submitted to 
them for publication.126  
 
While ensuring declaration of medical writing assistance is a very positive change, there 
are three issues that it does not resolve:  
• Declaration of medical writing assistance for new articles does not affect the 
literature published for the last few decades on which doctors still rely for most 
  
123  Logdberg, above n 121.  
124  Information received from a confidential source in the medical industry with background as a 
medical ‘ghostwriter’.  
125  Information received from a confidential source in the medical industry with background as a 
medical ‘ghostwriter’; Logdberg, above n 121.  
126  International Committee of Medical Journal Editors “Recommendations for the Conduct, 
Reporting, Editing, and Publication of Scholarly Work in Medical Journals (ICMJE Recommendations)” 
(August 2013) ICMJE <www.icmje.org>. 
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medicines that they prescribe. Much of this literature was produced by medical 
‘ghost-writers’ but attributed solely to independent academics.127   
• The process by which the article is written is not declared. The extent to which the 
company drove the key message of the article and selectively omitted or 
manipulated data is therefore still unknown to the reader. 
• Less reputable journals are not so rigorous. It has been reported that 
pharmaceutical companies emphasise speed over quality in their publication 
strategies; happy to target smaller, less reputable journals in order to claim and 
cite published articles for promotional materials.128 It is therefore possible that 
undisclosed medical ‘ghost-writing’ may still occur in these articles. 
 
In the United States it has now been suggested that academics who put their names to 
articles that are predominantly written and analysed by ghost-writers without disclosing 
those facts can be found guilty of fraud.129 While it is unlikely that many New Zealand-
based academics are acting as guest authors or Key Opinion Leaders for pharmaceutical 
companies, it is still desirable that the practice of medical writing without disclosure be 
considered fraudulent and punished if it is discovered.  
 
The peer review process is not an effective solution to the concerns surrounding medical 
writing, although it does ensure quality of the article in question in the sense that it 
checks methodology and results analysis presented in the article. There is disparity 
between different reviewers with respect to the attention placed on each piece they are 
given. Additionally, the reviewer will be unaware of the data as a whole and therefore, 
while able to critique the immediate analysis in the paper, will have no way of knowing 
the extent to which the sponsor has influenced the message or initial selection of the data 
  
127  Logdberg, above n 121; Xavier Bosch, Bijan Esfandiari and Leemon McHenry “Challenging 
Medical Ghostwriting in US Courts” (2012) 9 PLoS Med e1001163; Lacasse JR, Leo, J “Ghostwriting at 
Elite American Medical Centers in the United States” (2010) 7 PLoS Med e1000230; Information received 
from a confidential source in the medical industry with background as a medical ‘ghostwriter’. 
128  Information received from a confidential source in the medical industry with background as a 
medical ‘ghostwriter’.  
129  Simon Stern and Trudo Lemmens “Legal Remedies for Medical Ghostwriting: Imposing Fraud 
Liability on Guest Authors of Ghostwritten Articles” (2011) 8 PLoS Med e1001070; Bosch et al, above n 
127.  
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used in the article.130 It is unrealistic to hold the peer review process out as a solution to 
the issues of bias and hidden data found in academic articles, including those articles that 
are written by medical writers.  
 
New Zealand’s major contribution to medical writing is as a source of writers and a 
jurisdiction in which there is a strong medical writing industry. Most medical writers, 
while usually highly qualified, do not hold medical degrees or qualifications in statistical 
interpretation.131 Instead medical writers are usually educated in research or biomedical 
science. A former medical writer interviewed for this paper, who did have medical 
training, stated that their eventual reason for leaving the profession was that the things 
asked of them as a medical writer sometimes came into conflict with their professional 
ethical obligations as a doctor.132 The example given was that they were often asked to 
present data in a way that concealed negative aspects of the drug, thereby misleading 
patients and doctors who would eventually read their manuscripts. This could create 
outcomes that were damaging to the best interests of patients. The interviewee expressed 
doubt that someone trained in medicine could ethically act as a medical writer due to the 
conflicts of interest that were present. The interviewee also expressed concerns that 
medical writers are charged with writing-up the statistical interpretation of the data but do 
not usually have a background in statistics. Also recalled were a series of manuscripts 
worked on for a large pharmaceutical company in which data points from individual 
patients that indicated problems were selectively omitted from the PowerPoint slides that 
were to be used in poster presentations or for speakers.133  
 
  
130  Information received from a confidential source in the medical industry with background as a 
medical writer. 
131  Information received from a confidential source in the medical industry with background as a 
medical writer; European Medical Writers Association “Medical Writing” (2009) EMWA  
132  Information received from a confidential source in the medical industry with background as a 
medical writer. 
133  Information received from a confidential source in the medical industry with background as a 
medical ‘ghostwriter’. 
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There are some guidelines for medical writers, created mostly by various industry 
associations.134 However there is no official set of guidelines and no official recognition 
of the industry by the Ministry of Health or any other official body in New Zealand. It is 
submitted that full regulation of the medical writing industry would be difficult, 
expensive, and ineffective due to the fragmented nature of the profession and the high 
number of freelance writers. However, it is still desirable that the Ministry of Health 
publish a set of best practice guidelines or a similar document pertaining to the medical 
writing industry. This would not be expensive nor impose any compliance costs, but 
would give a soft incentive to the industry to comply with officially-authorised guidelines 
for best practice and transparency. While small, this step may increase transparency and 
more clearly enunciate the ethical issues involved in medical writing to those members of 
the profession. 
C Direct to Consumer Advertising 
In New Zealand pharmaceutical drugs are advertised directly to the public. This practice 
is only legal in two OECD countries- New Zealand and the United States.135 The internet 
also provides a direct avenue to consumers, something that regulators around the world 
have been slow to catch up with and which the ANZTPA scheme also has not yet 
provided for in detail.136 The practice of advertising directly to consumers has been 
shown to dramatically increase market share and cause wholesale switching to the 
advertised brand.137 It does not provide objective information to patients, has a negative 
effect on health funding, has a negative effect on the doctor-patient relationship, and can 
damage public health.138 However supporters of direct to consumer advertising, amongst 
  
134  Adam Jacobs and Elizabeth Wagner “Commentary: European Medical Writers Association 
(EMWA) guidelines on the role of medical writers in developing peer-reviewed publications” (2005) 21 
Current Medical Research and Opinion 317; the Australasian Medical Writers Association subscribes to the 
Media, Entertainment & Arts Alliance Code of Ethics.   
135  Les Toop and Dee Richards “New Zealand Deserves Better. Direct to Consumer Advertising 
(DTCA) of prescription medicines in New Zealand: for health or profit?” (2003) 116 NZMJ 1180.   
136  Hall, Dr Sandy Submission on the Description of a possible joint regulatory scheme for 
therapeutic products under ANZTPA (Women’s Health Action Trust, February 2013). 
137  Toop and Richards, above n 135. 
138  Toop and Richards, above n 135; Elizabeth Almasi, Randall Stafford, Richard Kravitz, Peter 
Mansfield “What are the Public Health Effects of Direct to Consumer Advertising?” (2006) 3 PLoS Med 
e145.  
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them being former Health and Disability Commissioner Ron Paterson, suggest that it 
allows patients to be better informed and facilitates more effective participation in 
healthcare.139  
 
This issue has received a great deal of academic attention in New Zealand and 
consequently will not be addressed further in this paper.140 It is, however, relevant to 
draw attention to direct to consumer advertising in the context of the information deficit. 
The information which most consumers receive on a day-to-day basis about medicines 
and medical interventions is provided by the pharmaceutical industry. Advertising of 
medicines and medical devices is of course subject to the requirements in Part 4 of the 
Medicines Act. Nevertheless, information in medicines advertising is presented in a 
biased way to further a commercial cause and is designed to display the medicine or 
device in a favourable light. This serves to exacerbate the current information deficit. 
Patients need access to independent, balanced material about drugs to be truly informed 
and to feel that they are effectively participating in decisions about their healthcare.   
D Summary 
Pharmaceutical companies frequently withhold important information and overstate the 
benefits of their medicines.141 This is unsurprising, given that they exist fundamentally to 
make a commercial profit. Independent, transparent assessment of the data and methods 
of clinical trials for new medicines is imperative. While Medsafe undertakes rigorous 
analysis and evaluations, it is essential to have as many eyes as possible on this 
information so that doctors and researchers can ‘check the working’, offer criticism and 
spot trends that might have been missed. 
 
 
  
139  Ron Paterson Advertising in the Age of Consumer Empowerment (Health and Disability 
Commissioner, September 1998); Almasi et al, above n 138.  
140  See for example, Manuel Evertz “Direct to consumer advertising of prescription drugs in New 
Zealand: justifications for a complete ban” (LLM Dissertation, Victoria University of Wellington, 2010).   
141  Bourgeois et al, above n 117; Bekelman et al, above n 117; Sergio, above n 117; Goldacre, above 
n 93, at 80; Lexchin et al, above n 117. 
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VI  Making Changes  
 
The public health impact of hidden data, publication bias and refusal by regulators to 
make public the information they hold about medicines is significant: Doctors cannot 
make fully informed treatment decisions, exposing patients to unnecessary risks and 
breaching patients’ right to give informed consent to treatments. Participants in clinical 
trials cannot be sure that the experiments done on them will be published and written up 
to contribute to the scientific literature. The New Zealand government and Pharmac 
spend millions of dollars on subsidising medicines and purchasing drugs like Tamiflu. 
Taxpayers, patients and doctors deserve to know that these important decisions are made 
according to all the information available, not a biased selection cherry-picked by 
medical journals, pharmaceutical companies and academics. The following sections 
explore legal options for reversing, combating and preventing the information deficit. 
 
The proposed solutions are twofold: 
• Firstly, to create a statutory duty to register the existence of all clinical trials 
undertaken in New Zealand or on New Zealand citizens on the ANZCTR and 
require that the sponsor of the trial update the register with the results of the 
clinical trial within a reasonable time after completion. 
•  Secondly, to include in the ANZTPA Rules and regulatory framework a 
requirement that the Agency maintain a publicly available database of all 
information, published or unpublished, submitted to it for drugs and medical 
devices that are approved for market. This information should include complete 
clinical study reports and the regulatory analysis.  
 
These solutions assume that the ANZTPA legislation and Treaty ratification will progress 
as planned by 2016. However it should alternatively be considered for the inevitable 
Medicines Act 1981 reform that would have to occur if the trans-Tasman agency does not 
proceed.  
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There are also administrative law options for doctors, patients or independent researchers 
wishing to access information from the regulator. These will continue to be available with 
regards to medicines under the trans-Tasman framework, although the exact functioning 
of these administrative law components in the ANZTPA context is yet to be established. 
The avenues explored are: 
• The Official Information Act 1987;  
• the Ombudsman; and 
• the Regulations Review Committee. 
A The ANZTPA Regime  
The entirely new regulatory environment created for the ANZTPA presents a golden 
opportunity to create a transparent, thorough, patient-focused regulatory scheme for 
Australia and New Zealand. To be truly effective, the Agency must ensure that it receives 
all necessary information from applicants for drug approval as well as provide patients, 
doctors and independent researchers with the information they need to make fully 
informed decisions.  
 
In Europe and the United States steps towards greater transparency and effective 
information access are also being taken.142  These proposals will not make Australasia 
uncompetitive nor will they stymie innovation and drug development. In fact, they will 
bring the ANZTPA in line with international practice.  
1 Information provided to the Agency 
Medsafe currently receives all information held by the applicant about the medicine 
submitted for approval, including clinical study reports, and also ensures that more 
studies are done if necessary. The same situation will apply in the ANZTPA scheme and 
the Agency will also be able to require former approval holders, former licensed 
manufacturers, and those lawfully supplying products that are exempt from approvals or 
  
142  See UK House of Commons, Science and Technology Select Committee Clinical Trials (written 
evidence, 6 March 2013); Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act 2007 Pub L No 110-85, § 801, 
121 Stat 904. 
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licences to provide relevant information.143 Failure to provide information for an 
approved product may result in regulatory action such as the suspension or cancellation 
of an approval.144 These provisions are a great improvement and must be rigorously 
enforced.  
The 2006 Bill gives the ANZTPA power to issue ‘information requirement notices’ (to be 
defined in the Rules).145 The Bill also provides for significant enforcement options, 
including penalties of up to 5 years’ imprisonment for submitting materially false or 
misleading information.146 Additionally, the holder of a product licence for a therapeutic 
product will be required, on becoming aware of adverse effect information, to give 
written notice to the Authority of that information.147  
 
The ANZTPA should demand full clinical study reports and trial data. Situations such as 
the problems that regulators and researchers are currently having obtaining full 
information about Tamiflu must not be repeated.148 If the proposed provisions are enacted 
and properly enforced they will create a robust information-gathering system for the 
ANZTPA that will ensure that the Agency receives all the information necessary to 
analyse new medicines and avoid repetition of past problems.149  
2 Information provided by ANZTPA to the public 
Data protection is important, especially in relation to medicines that are innovative and 
have not yet received approval. However the current protection that is given globally to 
data held by the industry has come at too high a price for public health.150 It is important 
to normalise a situation in New Zealand where manufacturers and regulators are 
encouraged to proactively disclose all information about safety, quality and efficacy of 
drugs. Medsafe’s mission statement is “To enhance the health of New Zealanders 
  
143  ANZTPA Discussion Paper, at 39.  
144  ANZTPA Discussion Paper, at 39.  
145  Clause 78.  
146  Clauses 74(4) and 79(5). 
147  Clause 76(1).  
148  See British Medical Journal “Tamiflu Campaign”, above n 78; Doshi, et al, above n 78.  
149  See Appendices one, two and three.  
150  See Appendices.  
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by regulating medicines and medical devices to maximise safety and benefit”.151  
Similarly, the ANZTPA Treaty indicates that the joint Agency’s primary concern will 
also be safeguarding public health and safety.152 Protection of public health and safety 
and ensuring public confidence in the regulatory system are factors that incline towards 
greater openness.153  
If the ANZTPA is truly to be a regulator that operates according to international best 
practice, it must provide transparency and release all the information, published and 
unpublished, that it receives from applicants for medicines approval proactively. This 
section proposes that ANZTPA create and maintain a searchable and accessible database 
containing all information it holds about medicines submitted for approval. Legislation is 
the most effective means for establishing this scheme, and will serve to normalise greater 
disclosure and transparency.154 Some possible provisions will be discussed below.  
Data protection and disclosure are not mentioned at all in the Treaty, leaving such 
provisions to be decided by Rules. The Discussion Paper deals with data protection very 
briefly. It states that the ANZTPA will not be able to use ‘protected information’ about an 
existing approved medicine when evaluating an application for a new medicine.155 
‘Protected information’ will include information about the active ingredient of the 
existing medicine if that information is not in the public domain. ‘Use’ was not defined in 
the Paper and could be interpreted extremely broadly. Information will be protected for a 
period of five years from when an innovative existing medicine receives approval. 
Finally, information will also be protected if the drug’s sponsor has not given ANZTPA 
permission in writing to use it. The discussion of this proposed data protection spans just 
a paragraph in the Paper. However, it does not arguably indicate intention to prohibit use 
of the clinical trial data, such as by disclosing it on a database. These data protection 
  
151   “About Medsafe” (10 May 2013) Medsafe <www.medsafe.govt.nz>. 
152  Joint Therapeutic Agency Treaty, above n 28, Preamble and art 2.  
153  Interview with Ron Paterson and Leo Donnelly, Ombudsmen (the author, Wellington, 11 
September 2013). 
154  Evidence submitted from the Editor and Deputy Editor of the British Medical Journal (CT23), UK 
House of Commons, Science and Technology Select Committee Clinical Trials (written evidence, 6 March 
2013), at 136. 
155  ANZTPA Discussion Paper, at 39, at 22.  
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provisions seem to be predominantly concerned with information relating to active 
ingredients and composition of the medicine.  
Clear legislative provisions should be enacted stating that one of the ANZTPA’s roles 
will be to proactively make all information it receives publicly available for every 
medicine that has been considered by it for approval, once Medsafe’s decision regarding 
approval has been made. This will initially involve significant resources and time as 
information currently held by Medsafe and the TGA would be uploaded to the database 
retrospectively. However once a database is established and properly populated the 
exercise should involve simply uploading data that is received, as required, after approval 
is granted. Correspondingly, the costs should drop away.  
This paper does not advocate for disclosure of any information about products before 
they have been approved for the market. This would be unreasonable and would 
considerably damage commercial interests.156  However, once approval has been granted 
or declined the ANZTPA should be mandated to upload the information it receives, with 
appropriate redaction, onto a public database. There is a definite public interest in the 
reasoning behind Medsafe’s decisions and risk/benefit analysis including for those drugs 
that are declined approval.157 Those drugs might still be prescribed to patients as 
unapproved medicines in certain cases.  
The type of information that may be redacted should be made very clear in legislation. 
Information about the active ingredient or production methods, for example, is not 
relevant to safety or efficacy and therefore does not need to be disclosed publicly. 
Similarly, information that allows trial participants to be identified should also be 
redacted. In most cases clinical study reports and other unpublished information will not 
contain identifying particulars. It is also worth noting that information about manufacture, 
active ingredient and molecular composition of a drug is available on the patents register.  
  
156  Written evidence of Sir Alasdair Breckenridge (CT12), UK House of Commons, Science and 
Technology Select Committee Clinical Trials (written evidence, 6 March 2013), at 64.  
157  Interview with Ron Paterson and Leo Donnelly, Ombudsmen (the author, Wellington, 11 
September 2013). 
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B Clinical Trial Register 
In addition to provisions requiring greater transparency from regulators, legislation 
should be put in place that requires all trials carried out in Australia or New Zealand and 
the results of those trials to be registered on the ANZCTR, which already provides a 
framework for voluntary trial registration. This will have a positive effect on scientific 
research and will also increase patient safety because of the improved likelihood that 
patterns in the data that indicate side effects will be detected. It will also allow patients 
and doctors to be better informed of all the research that has been done on a drug, not just 
that which is published.  
1 Registration 
The responsibility for the initial registering of clinical trials should fall on the ethics 
committee responsible for approving that trial. This should not be an onerous task. It 
would involve registering the new trial on the ANZCTR and entering basic details such 
as the sponsor’s identity, what is being tested, and how many participants are involved. 
All this information will be provided by the applicant for ethics approval and will 
therefore not require much extra time or work for the ethics committees to upload to the 
ANZCTR website. Alternatively, it could be a condition of approval that the trial be 
registered by the applicant before ethics approval is sought. To avoid any doubt, a 
provision in the ANZTPA ratifying legislation or a Rule requiring registration of all trials 
could be enacted. This would be desirable to ensure clarity and to empower the ethics 
committees with enforcement capabilities.  
 
Responsibility to update the register with the results of clinical trials should rest with the 
sponsor and researcher of each trial. Most of the information that the ANZTPA receives 
will be about drugs that were trialled in different jurisdictions, as relatively few clinical 
trials are done in New Zealand and Australia. Furthermore, not all clinical trials 
undertaken are for new medicine and are often testing or focused on improving current 
medicines. It is therefore impractical to expect that the ANZTPA assume responsibility 
for uploading the results of these trials, although it should have the power to enforce any 
breaches. In light of the dependence that Australia and New Zealand have on overseas 
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regulators and manufacturers and the small number of trials undertaken in the 
jurisdiction, the ANZTPA should have a separate statutory obligation to maintain a public 
database of the information it receives in applications, as discussed in Section A above.  
2 Legislative provision for the register 
Many experts giving written evidence in the UK Science and Technology Select 
Committee in March 2013 stated that regulation was needed to ensure that all clinical 
trial results are published.158 Such legislation has already been enacted in the United 
States, with mixed success due to inadequate enforcement.159 This subsection of the paper 
examines possible legislation for the enactment of the system for compulsory clinical trial 
registration discussed in subsection 1 above. Along with provision for the registration 
obligations discussed above, the following paragraphs provide an overview of legislative 
provisions that would be necessary for a compulsory clinical trial register.  
 
There are several key definitions that must be clearly set out, all of which have been 
recently defined in the United States legislation. ‘Results’ should be defined in such a 
way as to exclude individual patient data while expressly including full clinical study 
reports and other trial data, suitably anonymised. The precise requirements for 
anonymising patient information should also be prescribed to avoid confusion and ensure 
consistency. ‘Completion date’ is defined in the Food and Drug Administration 
Amendments Act 2007 as ‘the date that the final subject was examined or received an 
intervention for the purposes of final collection of data for the primary outcome’, or when 
the trial was terminated.160 ‘Reasonable time’ after the completion of the trial in which to 
post results will vary according to the context and circumstances of the trial, including the 
  
158  Antes G, Chalmers I “Under-reporting of clinical trials is unethical” (2003) 361 Lancet 978; 
Chalmers I, Glasziou P, Godlee “All trials must be registered and the results published: academics and non-
commercial funders are just as guilty as industry” (2012) 346 BMJ f105; Written Evidence Submitted by 
Sir Ian Chalmers, UK House of Commons, Science and Technology Select Committee Clinical Trials 
(written evidence, 6 March 2013), at 57; Written Evidence Submitted by Dr Ben Goldacre (CT55), UK 
House of Commons, Science and Technology Select Committee Clinical Trials (written evidence, 6 March 
2013), at 294; Written Evidence Submitted by Professor Lesley Stewart (CT15) UK House of Commons, 
Science and Technology Select Committee Clinical Trials (written evidence, 6 March 2013), at 75.  
159  See Part IV, Section C above.  
160  § 801, 121 Stat 904, at 905.  
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number of participants and the complexity of the data. The United States imposes a 
blanket rule of one year, with the option of extension upon application.161 The same rule 
is appropriate in Australia and New Zealand, with the ANZTPA able to grant extensions 
upon application. It was submitted in the Select Committee in the United Kingdom that 
after an appropriate time of checking the registry once the one-year deadline is up, a 
study that has not been reported upon could be flagged on the registry as “not published 
within x years”.162 This would serve as a ‘black mark’ against the trial and as a soft form 
of deterrent against suppression of clinical trials data.  
 
By legislating for a mandatory clinical trial register New Zealand and Australia will be 
improving accessibility to information about medicines and guaranteeing that participants 
in clinical trials make meaningful contributions to the development of our knowledge 
about medical interventions. Given that the ANZCTR framework already exists, this 
legislation does not require an entirely new scheme to be created, merely the upgrading of 
a pre-existing structure. Legislating for a mandatory clinical trial register will also be a 
move that aligns the Australasian regime with those in the United States and Europe.  
C Implications of the Proposed Changes 
There are potential risks associated with a public database for clinical trial data. As is the 
case whenever the risk profile of a system is changed, the behaviour of those being 
regulated may alter. Companies might elect to avoid undertaking certain trials which risk 
exposing an unfavourable aspect of their drug if they know that all the unpublished 
information that they must share with the regulator will be made public.163 It may seem 
more attractive for companies to withhold information from the regulator and risk the 
punishment of being found in breach of their obligations.164  
 
  
161  Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act 2007 Pub L No 110-85, § 801, 121 Stat 904, at 
912 to 914.  
162  Written evidence from Medical Schools Council and Association of UK University Hospitals 
(CT18), UK House of Commons, Science and Technology Select Committee Clinical Trials (written 
evidence, 6 March 2013), at 90.  
163  Opinion given by a confidential source in the government medicines/health area. 
164  Opinion given by a confidential source in the government medicines/health area. 
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There is also the threat of loss of competitiveness and consumer variety if regulations 
become too constraining and costly to justify entry into the market. This outcome has 
equally important public health risks and effects on consumers’ access to healthcare. The 
Australian and New Zealand markets are small, even when combined. Pharmaceutical 
companies target markets in North America and Europe first and foremost. Therefore 
there is a risk that by making the regulatory environment too restrictive, applications for 
medicines approval will be seen as commercially unviable and decline. Should this occur, 
New Zealand and Australian consumers will not be able to access the newest and best 
medicines. It seems, therefore, that the Australasian regulatory environment may be 
constrained to follow the North American and European markets with regards to 
disclosure requirements and transparency.  
 
There is a definite move towards transparency and greater disclosure in the northern 
hemisphere markets. The United States has legislated for compulsory clinical trial 
registration, the United Kingdom is undertaking a select committee inquiry into hidden 
data, and the European Union is moving towards practices that promote greater 
transparency and disclosure. It is important to manage the risks discussed in this section 
to ensure competitiveness is maintained in the Australasian market. However, by 2016, 
when the ANZTPA is scheduled to begin, it is likely that there will have been a further 
international shift towards greater transparency and disclosure. Creating a culture in 
which unpublished information is routinely made available and transparency is the norm 
is vital. While Australasia should be mindful of the situation in the northern hemisphere, 
this should not prevent it from making some progress towards greater disclosure in this 
area.  
 
VII   Administrative Law: Alternative Methods for Obtaining Information 
 
The following section explores the options provided by administrative law for patients, 
doctors and independent researchers to access unpublished information on the safety and 
efficacy of drugs that is held by the regulator. The options investigated are: use of the 
Official Information Act (OIA), seeking assistance from the Ombudsman, and lodging a 
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complaint with the Regulations Review Committee (RRC). These public law tools can be 
employed in New Zealand under the present Medicines Act regime and will continue to 
be available when the ANZTPA takes over.   
 
The ANZTPA will be accountable to the Australian and New Zealand Governments in 
the way that would normally apply to a regulatory agency established by domestic 
legislation.165 However it seems that extensive discussion will take place with Australia 
regarding the exact application of the systems in each country in relation to the ANZTPA. 
New Zealand’s systems may require some modification in respect of their application to 
the ANZTPA. The following subsections apply the current New Zealand law.  
A Official Information Act 1982 
The OIA will continue to apply to information held by ANZTPA and can be used at 
present to request official information held by Medsafe.166 It is unclear how often 
Medsafe receives OIA requests about medicines approval. The agency has made one OIA 
release in the past two years and six between 2005 and 2011.167 These releases involve 
information about the approval process taken for a particular medicine, adverse reaction 
information and investigations, and one Intensive Medicines Monitoring Programme 
report. This indicates that Medsafe is willing to release some information about particular 
medicines including information about effectiveness and safety, although mostly such 
information is given in the context of adverse effects monitoring and investigations rather 
than pre-emptively on the basis of information received from the medicines approval 
process.  
 
As discussed in Part IV above, Medsafe will make summaries of approval decisions and 
minutes of committee meetings available when requested.168 Summaries of approval 
decisions will also be available from the ANZTPA. However in general OIA requests 
asking for safety, efficacy or quality information received in the course of an approval 
  
165  Joint Therapeutic Agency Treaty, above n 28, art 8.  
166  Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill 2006 (103-1), cl 170. 
167  “Recent Official Information Act Releases” (17 April 2013) Medsafe <www.medsafe.govt.nz>; 
“Archive of Official Information Act Releases” (13 April 2013) Medsafe <www.medsafe.govt.nz>.  
168  Email from Susan Martindale, above n 16. 
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application will likely be declined for reasons of commercial sensitivity.169 Each request 
will necessarily have to be decided in its own context and on the balance of all the factors 
in the OIA. However, the rest of this subsection will provide a general discussion on 
some specific factors that will feature in this balance and what they indicate about the 
likelihood of success if a researcher were to request the release of the full clinical study 
report for an approved medicine from Medsafe.  
 
The underlying principle of the OIA is the presumption that information should be made 
available unless there is good reason to withhold it.170 None of the conclusive reasons for 
withholding information under section 6 apply in the context of information held about 
medicines. Therefore the only section relevant with regards to justifications for refusing 
to release information is section 9.  
 
Section 9(2)(a) provides for withholding of information to protect the privacy of natural 
persons. As discussed in Part IV, section E above, patient confidentiality and protection 
against release of identifying information in clinical study reports is important. However, 
the clinical study reports do not generally contain identifying features for individual 
patients. That information can also be effectively redacted where it is present in clinical 
study reports and other relevant unpublished documents. Justifying a refusal to provide 
clinical study reports and other safety information under section 9(2)(a) would generally 
be unsuccessful.  
 
Section 9(2)(b) of the OIA allows information to be withheld if releasing it would 
disclose a trade secret or unreasonably prejudice the commercial position of the person 
who supplied the information - this is a high threshold.171 The discussion in Part IV, 
section E above discussed these considerations in a broader context and should be 
referred to in relation to the OIA discussion below. Clinical study reports may contain 
commercially sensitive information in the sense that information suggesting the drug does 
  
169  Email from Susan Martindale, above n 17. 
170  Official Information Act 1982, s 5.  
171  David McGee Requests for Information Regarding the production of The Hobbit and film 
Production Generally (31 January 2013) at 12-13.  
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not have a favourable risk profile or may not be any better than a competitor or generic 
drug would be likely to negatively affect the manufacturer’s commercial position.172 The 
Ombudsman has noted that finding information is commercially sensitive alone is not 
sufficient reason for withholding it under the OIA.173  
 
There is precedent in New Zealand in the veterinary context holding that information 
about the active ingredient and chemical composition of a new medicine will be 
commercially sensitive and appropriately able to be withheld by the regulator using  
section 9(2)(b) of the OIA.174 In the context of veterinary medicines, the Hazardous 
Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (HASNO) provides a procedure for dealing 
with OIA requests and information that might be withheld.175 The Medicines Act does 
not have any similar sections apart from possibly section 23B protecting confidential 
supporting information about innovative medicines for a particular period. This statutory 
provision slightly colours the consideration of an OIA request and indicates that a greater 
significance will be placed on protection of confidential information received for 
approval of innovative medicines. Additionally, because the Medicines Act 1981 
expressly prescribes that this information be kept confidential it may not be able to be 
released in response to an OIA request.  
 
Given that the primary statute will colour OIA considerations, if the ANZTPA Rules and 
legislation include specific data protection provisions these may well alter the arguments 
made in this section with regards to the commercial sensitivity of the data received by 
ANZTPA. If the Rules were enacted with an express procedure for handling OIA 
requests, similar to that in the HASNO legislation, this would affect the probable 
outcome of an OIA consideration. It is hoped that, as outlined in sections A and B above, 
the ANZTPA will take a more transparent and pre-emptively accessible approach to 
releasing official information.  
  
172  Interview with Ron Paterson and Leo Donnelly, Ombudsmen (the author, Wellington, 11 
September 2013). 
173  Official Information Legislation Guides, above n 101, at 7 to 8; McGee, above n 171, at 12-13. 
174  Wyeth (NZ) Ltd v Ancare New Zealand Ltd [2010] NZSC 46.  
175  Wyeth, above n 174, at [14] and [45]; Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996, Part 5.  
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Arguably, information about safety and efficacy does not reach the same commercially 
sensitive threshold as information about the composition and active ingredient of a 
medicine. Additionally, as discussed in Part IV, section E clinical study reports do not 
contain information about long term development strategies or composition and active 
ingredients of the drug. While some of the content may be considered commercially 
sensitive, it may not be enough to reach the high threshold of ‘unreasonable prejudice’ to 
the commercial position of the manufacturer. Commercial sensitivity may not be made 
out just by suggesting that the risk profile of the drug may be revealed to be inferior to 
that of a competitor. 
 
A regulator might also be able to use section 9(2)(ba) to justify withholding information. 
This paragraph protects information which a person has been compelled to provide under 
an enactment- an applicant is compelled to provide Medsafe with all the information they 
hold on the safety, efficacy and quality of their drug. Making that information available 
could be considered likely to prejudice the supply of similar information. There might be 
a greater incentive for pharmaceutical companies to risk a fine and breach their statutory 
disclosure obligations if they know that the information that they provide may become 
publicly available. This would damage the public interest by hindering Medsafe or the 
ANZTPA’s ability to assess new medicines knowing that all necessary information is 
before them.  
 
There are also natural justice requirements at stake if manufacturers are effectively 
compelled to disclose clinical information about their products. They are compelled to 
provide all information to the regulator, including sensitive information that they might 
not normally wish to disclose, and then would have no option but for this information to 
be publicly displayed. However, the opportunity for redaction can lessen these risks to 
companies, as does the requirement that information is only made public after a decision 
has been made about their application. A manufacturer is not compelled to give Medsafe 
that information unless they wish to sell their drug to the New Zealand public. Any 
medicine entering the market must be safe and reasonably effective with benefits that 
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outweigh its risks. If a manufacturer’s drug does not meet those standards, or does not 
offer more benefits than a competitor the patients consuming it have a right to be fully 
informed of its shortcomings as much as they do its benefits.   
 
Even if the grounds discussed above are established, information must be disclosed if the 
justification for withholding it is outweighed by public interest.176 The Medicines Act 
itself is relevant in determining what the public interest involves in this context.177 The 
1981 Act does not include a purpose or principles section. However the 2006 Bill has the 
key objective of safeguarding public health and the safety of New Zealanders.178 This 
represents the most recent enunciation of Parliament’s intention and involves a primary 
focus on public health and safety. The primary purpose of the ANZTPA Treaty is also to 
safeguard public health.  
 
In the area of pharmaceutical drugs and medical devices, there is a high public interest in 
disclosure. As emphasised in Part IV, hidden data and publication bias have a significant 
negative impact on public health and can pose real and serious risks for patients. There is 
substantial evidence that doctors and patients cannot make effective and fully informed 
health decisions if they do not have access to all the unpublished information about 
medicines.179 Additionally, independent researchers would be able to conduct further 
investigations and meta-analyses which would improve medical understanding and 
knowledge. These factors create a compelling argument in favour of access to official 
information in order to protect the public interest. It is arguable that all but the strongest 
arguments under s 9(2)(a), (b) or (ba) would be overridden by the public interest.  
B Ombudsman 
The ANZTPA will be subject to the Ombudsmen Act 1975 and the Australian 
Ombudsmen Act, with both offices co-operating in their investigations.180 In Europe, the 
  
176  Official Information Act 1982, s 9(1); see also McGee above n 171, at 26.  
177  GDS Taylor and JK Gorman Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective (2nd ed, Lexis Nexis, 
Wellington, 2010) at 304.  
178  Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill 2006 (103-1), explanatory note.  
179  See Part IV above.  
180  Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill 2006 (103-1), cl 154 and 155.  
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Ombudsman has been a champion for open access to information about drugs and clinical 
trials in the context of a maladministration complaint against the European Medicines 
Agency.181 However it does not appear that the New Zealand Ombudsman has ever been 
asked to assist with a matter relating to pharmaceutical drugs and information access of 
the nature discussed in this paper.  
 
The Ombudsman could provide a cost effective avenue for accessing clinical study 
reports and other unpublished data. Additionally, because the Ombudsman’s 
investigations are carried out in private, there is no danger of premature public disclosure 
of information that should be kept confidential.182 The Ombudsman currently has 
jurisdiction to investigate complaints against Medsafe as it is a part of the Ministry of 
Health.183 However in the context of information access it is likely that the most common 
exercise of the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction will be the express function given under the 
OIA to investigate a refusal to release information.184 
C Regulations Review Committee 
The Regulations Review Committee (RRC) examines all regulations, investigates 
complaints, and examines proposed regulation-making powers.185 Six of the eight States 
of Australia have a Regulatory Review Committee equivalent but no state allows public 
complaints to be made, as is the practice in New Zealand. This raises the question of 
whether the ANZTPA will remain subject to RRC oversight and whether, if so, 
Australian citizens can lay complaints about any Ministerial Council Rules with the RRC. 
In the absence of any guidance on whether the RRC complaints process will remain in 
place vis-á-vis the ANZTPA, this paper will assume that it will.  
 
A regulation cannot be reviewed on its merits. However a complaint can be based on 
several grounds relating broadly to the relationship between regulation and the relevant 
  
181  Decision of the European Ombudsman, above n 102.  
182  Ombudsmen Act 1975, ss 18 and 21.  
183  Ombudsmen Act 1975, Schedule 1, Part 1.  
184  Official Information Act 1982, s 28.  
185  Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2008, at [7.79]-[7.78]; Standing Orders of the House of 
Representatives 2011, SO314.  
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Act, or on procedural grounds.186 If, for example, the Ministerial Council declines to 
make Rules which provide for information access or clinical trial registration, as 
described in Sections A and B above, it may be possible to complain to the RRC about 
such Rules and claim that they breach the public safety mandate described in the Treaty 
and empowering legislation.  
 
The most relevant ground for challenging a Rule in this context would be that it is not in 
accordance with the general objects and intentions of the statute under which it is 
made.187 All Rules made by the Ministerial Council or Managing Director to constitute 
the regulatory framework must give effect to the objectives of the Treaty.188 The 
objective is first and foremost to facilitate public health and create a scheme for 
regulating medicines according to international best practice. Arguably, a clinical trials 
register and better public access to information is current international best practice. 
Furthermore, public health is better facilitated by allowing doctors and researchers to 
access unpublished data, as was explored in Part IV above.  
 
There may therefore be grounds for complaint if any future Rules hinder such public 
information access and publication of clinical trial data. However this is predicated on the 
assumption that the RRC oversight and complaints process remain applicable to the 
ANZTPA. It would be highly unsatisfactory if the ANZTPA were to be immune from the 
regulations complaints process, especially because it is a body with legal personality in 
Australia only and because the regulation of medicines and medical devices is such a 
crucial part of the public health system in New Zealand and Australia. Given this 
significance full public scrutiny of the decision-making body is important, especially 
given the extensive powers to create delegated legislation that have been given to the 
Ministerial Council and Managing Director.  
 
In addition to complaints, public participation in regulatory decision-making is possible 
via participation in things like patient interest groups. However, there is a risk that only 
  
186  Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 2011, SO315(2).  
187  Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 2011, SO315(2)(a). 
188  Joint Therapeutic Agency Treaty, above n 28, art 9.  
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larger industry players will have a significant lobby voice, given the comparative power 
and resources available to most large pharmaceutical companies operating in the 
Australasian market.189 This may ‘drown out’ the impact of patient groups to some 
extent, making the more formal complaints process more important in the context of 
pharmaceutical regulation. There may also be a role for a consumer or patient advocacy 
group more generally, which can gather information and be consulted on Rules made by 
the Ministerial Council on behalf of consumers in Australia and New Zealand.190 
 
VIII    Conclusion 
 
This paper has provided an overview of the current and proposed future legislative 
structures that regulate medicines and medical devices in New Zealand. It has done so in 
light of the deficit in information relating to safety and efficacy data for medicines and 
medical devices. While this analysis is relevant to Medsafe, especially the administrative 
law discussion, most of its application will be in the context of the ANZTPA scheme. The 
ANZTPA project is an opportunity to implement substantial changes in the way that 
medicines are regulated in New Zealand and Australia to remedy the information deficit 
and protect public health and welfare.  
 
The key propositions in this paper are: 
• That the ANZCTR should become a mandatory clinical trials registry for 
all trials done in Australia and New Zealand, with ethics committees and 
trial sponsors holding responsibility for populating the register. Sufficient 
enforcement powers and resourcing should be provided for in legislation 
or Rules to ensure the efficacy of this scheme.  
  
189  Discussed in the context of electricity regulation in Mark Bennett and Joel Colon-Rios “Public 
Participation in New Zealand’s Regulatory Processes” in Susy Frankel and Deborah Ryder (eds) 
Recalibrating Behaviour: Smarter Regulation in a Global World (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2013) 181 from 
214.  
190  Discussed in Bennet and Colon-Rios, above n 189, at 217 and 260.  
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• That a statutory duty should be imposed on the ANZTPA to make all the 
unpublished information it holds about medicines that pass through the 
approval process publicly available. 
• That, generally speaking, the arguments for preventing disclosure of 
official information containing clinical study reports and other 
unpublished raw data would not outweigh the significant public interest in 
disclosure.  
• That administrative law ‘tools’ such as OIA requests, Regulations Review 
Committee complaints, and use of the Ombudsman may assist in 
facilitating disclosure of trial data and clinical study reports held by 
Medsafe or the ANZTPA. 
 
These conclusions should be considered and implemented in the context of the ANZTPA 
scheme in order to create a more transparent system which is aligned with the emerging 
international best practice. Additionally, use of the administrative law tools discussed 
could be done effectively under the current Medicines Act regime. Australia and New 
Zealand are constrained to follow the larger European and North American markets with 
regards to disclosure requirements and transparency or risk creating a regulatory 
environment that is seen by the industry as overly burdensome and therefore unviable. 
However, this does not mean that any attempt to improve transparency and disclosure in 
the Australasian market should be abandoned. The ANZTPA scheme is scheduled to 
come into force in 2016, by which time there will have been further progress made 
internationally which Australasia should ensure it remains consistent with.  
 
Bitter experience has shown that the information deficit in relation to medicines and 
medical devices has real and significant impacts, as illustrated by the appendices attached 
below. This is not something that patients are generally aware of yet it directly impacts 
their right to be fully informed before making a treatment decision. Additionally, it 
affects decisions to publicly fund medicines and distorts the medical literature on which 
doctors rely when evaluating treatment options in the context of an individual patient. 
Legislative change is one aspect that is required to remedy this situation. It is important to 
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create a culture of transparency and openness amongst government regulators that 
facilitates better informed treatment decisions and improved public health and safety.  
56 Evidence Based Medicine? Access to Information and Medicines Regulation in New Zealand 
 
IX  Appendix One 
 
This is an anecdote taken from Bad Pharma by Ben Goldacre.191 
 
“Reboxetine is a drug I myself have prescribed. Other drugs had done nothing for this 
patient, so we wanted to try something new. I’d read the trial data before I wrote the 
prescription, and found only well-designed, fair tests, with overwhelmingly positive 
results. Reboxetine was better than placebo, as good as any other antidepressant in head-
to-head comparisons. It’s approved for use by the Medicines and Healthcare products 
Regulatory Agency (MHRA), which governs all drugs in the UK. Millions of doses are 
prescribed every year, around the world. Reboxetine was clearly a safe and effective 
treatment. The patient and I discussed the evidence briefly, and agreed it was the right 
treatment to try next. I signed a piece of paper, a prescription, saying I wanted my patient 
to have this drug. 
 
But we had both been misled. In October 2010 a group of researchers were finally able to 
bring together all the trials that had ever been conducted on reboxetine.192 Through a long 
process of investigation- searching on academic journals but also arduously requesting 
data from the manufacturers and gathering documents from regulators- they were able to 
assemble all the data, both from trials that were published, and from those that had never 
appeared in academic papers. 
 
When all this trial data was put together it produced a shocking picture. Seven trials had 
been conducted comparing reboxetine against placebo. Only one, conducted in 254 
patients, had a neat positive result, and that one was published in an academic journal, for 
doctors and researchers to read. But six more trials were conducted, in almost ten times as 
  
191  Ben Goldacre Bad Pharma: How drug companies mislead doctors and harm patients (Fourth 
Estate, London, 2012) at 5.   
192  Dirk Eyding, Monika Lelgemann, Ulrich Grouven, Martin Harter, Mandy Kromp, Thomas Kaiser, 
Michaela F Kerekes, Martin Gerken, Beate Wieseler,“Reboxetine for Acute Depression: Systematic 
Review and Meta-Analysis of Published and Unpublished Placebo and Selective Serotonin Reuptake 
Inhibitor Controlled Trials” (2010) 341 BMJ c4737; Sarah Boseley “Antidepressant Reboxetine No Better 
than a Placebo, Study Finds” The Guardian (online ed, United Kingdom, 13 October 2010).  
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many patients. All of them showed that reboxetine was no better than a dummy sugar pill. 
None of these trials was published. I had no idea they existed.  
 
It got worse. The trials comparing reboxetine against other drugs showed exactly the 
same picture: three small studies, 507 patients in total, showed that reboxetine was just as 
good as any other drug. They were all published. But 1,657 patients’ worth of data was 
left unpublished, and this unpublished data showed that patients on reboxetine did worse 
than those on other drugs. If all this wasn’t bad enough, there was also the side-effects 
data. The drug looked fine in trials which appeared in academic literature: but when we 
saw the unpublished studies, it turned out that patients were more likely to have side 
effects, more likely to drop out of taking the drug, and more likely to withdraw from the 
trial because of side effects, if they were taking reboxetine rather than one of its 
competitors.  
… 
I did everything a doctor was supposed to do. I read all the papers, I critically appraised 
them, I understood them, I discussed them with my patient, and we made a decision 
together, based on the evidence. In the published data, reboxetine was a safe and effective 
drug. In reality, it was no better than a sugar pill, and worse, it does more harm than 
good. As a doctor I did something which, on the balance of the evidence, harmed my 
patient, simply because unflattering data was left unpublished.”  
 
NB: Reboxetine is an antidepressant manufactured by Pfizer sometimes referred to by the 
trade name Edronax. 
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X   Appendix Two: SSRIs in children and adolescents 
 
This case study is a summary of an investigation by the Medicines and Health Products 
Regulatory Authority in the United Kingdom (MHRA): 193  Selective Serotonin Reuptake 
Inhibitors (SSRIs) are drugs that have approval in New Zealand and several other 
countries for treatment of depression in adults. Examples of SSRIs include fluoxetine 
(commonly referred to by its trade name, Prozac) and paroxetine (also known as Seroxat). 
Medsafe issued a warning to health practitioners following the revelations about the use 
of SSRIs in children and has since undertaken further studies on SSRIs in children.194   
 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) developed Seroxat and it was approved for the market in the late 
1980s. Between 1994 and 2009 GSK conducted nine trials on the safety and efficacy of 
SSRIs in children. None of these found that SSRIs were effective in treating paediatric 
depression; additionally there was evidence of a risk of increased suicidal behaviour 
caused by Seroxat, meaning that the risks of its use in children far outweighed the 
benefits.195 Because Seroxat was not legally approved for use in children, GSK were not 
required to share this information with regulators, including Medsafe.196 However 
Seroxat was being prescribed to thousands of children in the UK and in New Zealand as 
an unapproved medicine. It was not until 2003, when GSK handed out briefing 
documents to the MHRA about a proposed application to extend the approval of SSRIs to 
children that the safety issues were brought to the attention of regulators around the 
world.197  
  
193  MHRA Investigation into Glaxosmithkline/ Seroxat (Medicines and Healthcare Products 
Regulatory Agency UK, summary, 6 March 2008).  
194  Letter from Dr Stewart Jessamine (Principal Technical Specialist, Medsafe) to health professionals 
regarding the use of SSRI antidepressants in children and adolescents (22 March 2004); Medsafe “Selective 
Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) In children and adolescents” (2009) 30 Prescriber Update 1 at 1. 
195  MHRA Investigation into Glaxosmithkline/ Seroxat (Medicines and Healthcare Products 
Regulatory Agency UK, summary, 6 March 2008) at [2] and [13].   
196  Letter from Dr Stewart Jessamine (Principal Technical Specialist, Medsafe) to health professionals 
regarding the use of SSRI antidepressants in children and adolescents (22 March 2004).  
197  MHRA Investigation into Glaxosmithkline/ Seroxat (Medicines and Healthcare Products 
Regulatory Agency UK, summary, 6 March 2008) at [10] to [12].  
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XI    Appendix Three: Vioxx 
 
The following is an excerpt from an article in The Listener (17 November 2012) written 
by Mark Broatch:198 
 
“In 2004 a popular anti-inflammatory drug known as Vioxx (rofecoxib) was withdrawn 
worldwide by Merck Sharp & Dohme after years in the market and having made billions 
of dollars for the company. A study had found using it for longer than 18 months could 
measurably increase the risk of heart attack and stroke. Medical journal the Lancet said 
unacceptable risks were apparent years earlier. At the time, about 15,000 New Zealanders 
were using Vioxx for pain relief and inflammation.  
 
Subsequent studies, including a Swiss study that combined 31 randomised, controlled 
trials in various countries involving more than 100,000 patients, have since confirmed the 
high level of risk of many popular painkillers, known as non-steroidal anti-inflammatory 
drugs (NSAIDs), when taken long-term. Brands still sold in New Zealand include 
Naprosyn (naproxen), Nurofen (ibuprofen) and Voltaren (diclofenac).  
 
And in 2007, another anti-inflammatory, Prexige, was withdrawn from sale following 
reports of severe liver damage in people taking more than 200mg a day. At the time, 
more than 1000 New Zealanders were reported to be taking twice that dose.”  
 
 
 
  
  
198  Mark Broatch “Bitter Pills” The Listener (New Zealand, 17 November 2012) at 16.  
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